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The Crime-Fraud Exception
to the Attorney-Client Privilege
in the Context of Corporate Counseling
BY H. LOWELL BROwN*
INTRODUCTION
he evidentiary privilege protecting a client's confidential
communication with an attorney from disclosure to third parties
is a central element of the relationship between attorney and
client.' This attorney-client privilege is generally regarded as the oldest of
the common law privileges,2 dating back to the reign of Elizabeth I?
* Copyright © 1999. Assistant General Counsel, Northrop Grumman
Corporation. B.A. 1969, Syracuse University; J.D. 1976, Antioch School of Law.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of Northrop Grumman Corporation.
'Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard has observed:
The attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal element of the
modem American lawyer's professional functions. It is considered
indispensable to the lawyer's function as advocate on the theory that the
advocate can adequately prepare a case only if the client is free to disclose
everything, bad as well as good. The privilege is also considered necessary
to the lawyer's function as confidential counselor in law on the similar
theory that the legal counselor can properly advise the client what to do
only if the client is free to make full disclosure.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,An Historical Perspective on theAttorney-ClientPrivilege,
66 CAL. L. REv. 1061, 1061 (1978).
2 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (recognizing the
attorney-client privilege as "the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications known to the common law").
3 See JoHN HENRYWIGMORE, 8 EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMONLAW § 2290,
at 542 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Indeed, it has been suggested that the privilege
has its origins in Roman law. See Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-
Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 191, 216
(1989); Maureen H. Burke, The Duty of Confidentiality and Disclosing Corporate
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The underlying rationale of the privilege is the encouragement of "full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients" in order to
"promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administra-
tion ofjustice."4 Quite simply, the privilege recognizes that in the absence
of a guaranty of confidentiality, a client would be reluctant to confide
possibly damaging information to an attorney, thereby hampering or
preventing the attorney from rendering informed legal advice.' Thus, the
Misconduct, 36 Bus. LAW. 239, 242 (1981); J.T. Fisher, Comment, Witnesses-
Competency-Whether Confidential Revelations By Client to Attorney Regarding
Future Criminal or Fraudulent Transactions Must Be Divulged, 33 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 271, 272 (1955); Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to
Corporations, the Role ofEthics and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U. L. REV.
235,235 (1961) [hereinafter Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege].
' Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389; accord Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11
(1996); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348
(1985); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("The lawyer-
client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that
relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission
is to be carried out."); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("The
purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their
attorneys."); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,470 (1888) ("[The attorney-client
privilege] is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of
justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its
practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from
the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure."); Scott R. Flucke, The
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting: Counsel's Dual Role as
Attorney and Executive, 62 UMKC L. REV. 549, 551 (1994) (citing Upjohn Co.);
David B. Merchant, Note, Defense Counsel As Prosecution Witness: A Combined
Doctrine to Govern Attorney Disclosure, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1081, 1082-83 (1991)
(citing Upjohn Co. and presenting three policies underlying the privilege). That the
privilege in the corporate setting encourages candor appears to be born out
empirically. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 244 ("A solid majority of both the
attorneys and the executives in the survey said they believed the privilege does, in
fact, encourage candor.").
5 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403 ("As a practical matter, if the client knows that
damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following
disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be
reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully informed
legal advice."); Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666,
674 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The purpose of the privilege would be undermined if people
were required to confide in lawyers at the peril of compulsory disclosure every
time the government decided to subpoena attorneys it believed represented
particular suspected individuals."); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2291, at 545 ("In
1192 [VOL. 87
THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed;
hence the law must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent. Such is
the modem theory."); see also David S. Caudill, Sympathy For the Devil?:
Reflections on the Crime-Fraud Exception to Client Confidentiality, 8 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 369, 374 (1993) ("[I]f expansive exceptions to the rule of
confidentiality are created, lawyer-client relations will suffer and one of the
foundations of lawyering as we know it will begin to collapse."); Steven A. Migala,
1.R.C. § 60501 and the Attorney-Client Privilege: The Misplaced Emphasis on
Incrimination over Confidentiality, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 509, 527 ("If lawyers
cannot confidently advise their clients in the initial stages of a consultation that
specific facts will be protected by the privilege, clients will not feel free to engage
in open discussion with their attorneys. This uncertainty will ultimately result in a
suboptimal level of representation."); Merchant, supra note 4, at 1090 ("Clients
who fear that their attorneys will disclose damaging information may forego
representation. Without adequate legal representation, clients may not be able to
fully assess their legal claims and may fail to receive justice."); E. Elizabeth
Perlman, Note, The Attorney-ClientPrivilege: A Look at Its Effect on the Corporate
Client and the Corporate Executive, 55 IND. L.J. 407,408 (1980) ("[A]s executives
realize that they may not be protected by the corporation, the corporate attorney-
client privilege will not serve to encourage the executive to provide corporate
counsel with the information necessary to make legal decisions for the
corporation.") (footnotes omitted). This premise has been questioned. See, e.g.,
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464,469-72 (1977) [hereinafter Note, FixedRules].
Indeed, it has been suggested that, in a criminal proceeding, the attorney-client
privilege is of constitutional dimension in light of the defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. See id. at 485-86 ("[W]hen the fifth and sixth amendments are
considered together, the individual accused of crime does seem to have a right to
attorney-client privilege. Without a right to privilege, the exercise of either
constitutional right would require a waiver of the other."); Christopher Paul
Galanek, Note, The Impact of the Zolin Decision on the Crime-Fraud Exception to
theAttorney-ClientPrivilege, 24 GA.L.REV. 1115, 1118 (1990) ("The defendant's
testimonial privilege against self-incrimination is violated if the court forces his
personal representative to testify to information disclosed by the defendant.").
Professor Hazard has noted in this regard that abolition of the attorney-client
privilege
would mean that an accused in a criminal case could not explain his version
of the matter to his lawyer without its being transmitted to the prosecution.
Defense counsel would become a medium of confession, a result that would
substantially impair both the accused's right to counsel and the privilege
1998-991 1193
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attorney-client privilege shields from disclosure not only the legal advice
provided by the lawyer, but also the giving of information to the lawyer by
the client upon which the lawyer's advice is based.'
Nevertheless, the attorney-client privilege also interferes with the truth-
finding process by shielding otherwise probative evidence from disclosure.7
One noted commentator has observed:
There may be a sufficientjustification for the privilege; indeed the verdict
of our legal history is to that effect. But no argument of justification
should ignore the fact that the attorney-client privilege, as far as it goes,
against self-incrimination. Hence, it is common ground that the privilege
ought to apply at least to communications by an accused criminal to his
counsel, in contemplation of defense ofa pending or imminently threatened
prosecution, concerning a completed crime.
Hazard, supra note 1, at 1062 (footnotes omitted). Of course, a corporation does
not enjoy a Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. See
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 (1988); Curcio v. United States, 354
U.S. 118, 122 (1957); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
In addition, preservation of the attorney-client privilege has also been viewed
as essential to the attorney's ethical responsibilities to the client See EllenR. Peirce
& Leonard J. Colamarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness for the Prosecution:
Curbing the Practice oflssuing Grand Jury Subpoenas to Counsel for Targets of
Investigations, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 838 (1985) ("[W]ithout the attorney-client
privilege it would be difficult to maintain a sense of loyalty between the attorney
and his client, or to comply with the fundamental ethical requirements inherent in
the fiduciary relationship between the two.") (footnotes omitted); see also Migala,
supra, at 519 ("[A] strong tradition of loyalty attaches to the relationship of
attorney and client. This tradition would be undermined by routine examination of
the lawyer as to a client's confidential communications.").
6 See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390 ("[T]he privilege exists to protect not only
the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of
information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice.").
7 This may be particularly so in the corporate setting. See Alexander, supra note
3, at 195. Alexander states:
Unlike the individual client, a corporation can "speak" to counsel only
through agents-its officers and employees. In a large corporation, cloaking
all such communications with an inflexible privilege may produce a veil of
darkness so impenetrable in some cases as to preclude effective discovery
of the truth. The modem trend toward increased participation of house
counsel in the day-to-day affairs of large corporations makes this prospect




is not only a principle of privacy, but also a device for cover-ups. That, of
course, is what makes contemplation of it both interesting and troubling.
8
In recognition of this "troubling" effect, the privilege is construed
narrowly and applied "only where necessary to achieve its purpose."9 In
8 Hazard, supra note 1, at 1062. Jeremy Bentham was a critic of the privilege
for this reason as well. Bentham stated:
A rule of law which, in the case of the lawyer, gives an express licence to
that wilful concealment of the criminal's guilt, which would have
constituted any other person an accessory in the crime, plainly declares that
the practice of knowingly engaging one's self as the hired advocate of an
unjust cause is, in the eye of the law, or (to speak intelligibly) in that of the
law-makers, an innocent, if not a virtuous practice. But for this implied
declaration, the man who in this way hires himself out to do injustice or
frustrate justice with his tongue, would be viewed in exactly the same light
as he who frustrates justice or does injustice with any other instrument.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2291, at 551 (quoting Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of
JudicialEvidence, 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 479 (Bowring ed., 1842)).
However, as Professor Louisell observed:
Anglo-American analysis commonly proceeds from the premise that
recognition of the privileges constitutes a perpetual threat to the
ascertainment of truth in litigation. Assuming for present purposes the
validity of this premise (which should be further tested by comparative law
inquiry), it is nevertheless submitted that there are things even more
important to human liberty than accurate adjudication. One of them is the
right to be left by the state unmolested in certain human relations.
David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 110 (1956); accord Gregory I.
Massing, Note, The Fifth Amendment, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and the
Prosecution of White-Collar Crime, 75 VA. L. REV. 1179, 1198 (1989) ("Although
invocation of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate setting may at times
frustrate prosecutions by creating a 'zone of silence' around corporate affairs, this
general criticism of the attorney-client privilege is outweighed by the broader goal
of encouraging the giving and receiving of sound legal advice.") (footnote
omitted).
9 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403; accord In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d
1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 1992); Clarke v. American Commerce Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d
127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992); Fausek v. White, 965 F.2d 126, 132 (6th Cir. 1992);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-24 (3d Cir.
1991); In re Grand Jury Proceeding, Cherney, 898 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1990);
In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury
Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Sealed Case,
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order for the privilege to be effective in achieving the goal of compliance
with law resulting from sound legal advice based on client candor,
however, there must be predictable certainty that the confidentiality of
client communications will be preserved.1"
Increasingly, prosecutors and civil litigants are seeking to invade
attorney-client confidences by claiming that the client's consultation with
counsel was not bona fide'I but, instead, was for the purpose of furthering
676 F.2d 793, 806-07 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d
1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973);
Garnerv. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1970); RadiantBurners,
Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963). As Wigmore has
commented:
[T]he privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its
benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete.
... It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is
nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be
strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the
logic of its principle.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2291, at 554.
" See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 393.
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney
and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one
which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.
Id.; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996) ("Making the promise of
confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative
importance of the patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for
disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege."); John William
Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege: Cases Applying Upjohn, Waiver,
Crime-Fraud Exception, and Related Issues, 38 BUs. LAw. 1653, 1663 (1983)
("[F]or the attorney-client privilege to have any practical value, the communicator
must be able to predict whether any given communication will be within the
privilege at the time the communication is made."); NoteAttorney-ClientPrivilege
for Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REv. 424, 426 (1970)
("If the privilege is to achieve its purpose of encouraging communications, the
communicants must be able to discern at the stage of primary activity whether the
communications will be privileged.").
" Indeed, it has been suggested that communications with a lawyer for an
illegal purpose would not be privileged in the first instance.
[There] are situations in which the client is doing or planning to do
something that is very bad, such as committing a crime or destroying
evidence, or where the client wants the lawyer to do something very bad,
1196 [VOL. 87
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an intended crime or fraud. 2 This "crime-fraud" exception to the attorney-
client privilege is similarly of common law origin 3 and is well-established
in American law."
The application of the crime-fraud exception to communications made
in the course of counseling, particularly when the client is a corporation, is
still troubling. The evaluation of whether the communication was in
furtherance of a crime is made after the communication itself and often
long after the crime. Further, it is the client's intent in consulting with
such as suborning perjury or aiding in fraud. In such circumstances, it is
arguable that the privilege, by its own terms, is not applicable. That is, if the
client has in mind anything but a "legitimate" purpose in consulting a
lawyer, it might be said that communications between them are neither "in
the course of" the attorney-client relationship nor in "professional"
confidence.
Hazard, supra note 1, at 1063-64 (footnotes omitted); accord Note, The Lawyer-
Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 237. This is Dean Wignore's view as well. See
8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2298 ("It has been agreed from the beginning that the
privilege cannot avail to protect the client in concerting with the attorney a crime
or other evil enterprise; and for the logically sufficient reason that no such
enterprise falls within the just scope of the relation between legal adviser and
client.").
2One court recently observed:
Until recently, federal prosecutors rarely subpoenaed attorneys to
compel testimony relating to their clients. This practice changed in the
1980s as the federal government stepped up its fight against organized
crime and narcotics trafficking. Most significantly, Congress passed several
new federal statutes which, in the eyes of federal prosecutors, make
attorneys fertile ground for eliciting incriminating information about the
targets of federal investigations and prosecutions.
Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1352 (1st
Cir. 1995); see also Max D. Stem & DavidHoffman, PrivilegedInformers: TheAt-
torney Subpoena Problem and a ProposalforReform, 136 U. PENN. L. REv. 1783,
1800 (1988); White Collar CrimeMeetingAddresses Issues ofPrivilege, Corporate
"Good Citizenship," 61 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1020, 1023 (Apr. 2, 1997).
13 See, for example, Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. St. Trials 1139 (1743), a
case which Professor Hazard has observed, "reads like source material for a
Dickens novel-indeed, its facts make David Copperfield seem a pale contrivance."
Hazard, supra note 1, at 1073; see also David J. Fried, Too High a Pricefor Truth:
The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and
Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443,446-461 (1986); Galanek, supra note 5, at 1122-24.
1 For a listing of numerous citations to early American cases, see Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1933).
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counsel, rather than counsel's knowledge of the client's purpose, that
determines whether the communication was in furtherance of an intended
crime or fraud and therefore unprivileged.
In effect, the crime-fraud exception allows for the transformation of an
attorney into a witness against the attorney's client (or the individual who
acts on behalf of a corporate client) simply because the client disregarded
counsel's legal advice and subsequently committed an allegedly criminal
act. Even the possibility that counsel may later be compelled to be a wit-
ness undermines the trust between client and attorney and the assurance of
confidentiality that is the essence of legal counseling and "preventive law."
Two recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit cast this issue in sharp relief. In the first, In re Grand Jury
Proceedings,'- a panel of the Ninth Circuit held that the crime-fraud
exception applied "even if the attorney does nothing after the communica-
tion to assist the client's commission of a crime, and even though the
communication turns out not to help (and perhaps even to hinder) the
client's completion of a crime."' 6 In the second decision, United States v.
Chen, 7 the crime-fraud exception was upheld even though "the lawyers in
this case were innocent of any wrongful intent, and had no knowledge that
their services were being used [to commit the alleged crime].""8
These rulings infuse the attorney-client relationship with uncertainty
about whether the confidentiality of the client's communication will be
preserved from later scrutiny and raise the unsettling prospect of counsel
becoming a witness against the client. 9 This uncertainty is only exacer-
'5 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377 (9th Cir. 1996).
1d. at 382. The court went on to say that "inasmuch as the government need
not establish, for purposes of the crime-fraud exception, that the crimes succeeded
... the government is not required to prove that the communications with [the
attorneys] in fact helped the targets commit the crimes." Id.
17 United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1996).8 Id. at 1504.
1 Indeed, it has been observed that attorneys should give "Miranda-like
warnings" when counseling clients.
Today, when a client consults an attorney for legal advice, the attorney
can no longer confidently tell the client that all the information entrusted to
the attorney is privileged and therefore will be kept in strict confidence. The
traditional expectations about the scope of the attorney-client and work-
product privilege no longer hold true. Indeed, more than one commentator
has suggested that under the emerging case law of "no attorney-client
privilege," the attorney would be well advised to give each new client a
Miranda-like warning about the manner in which the client's disclosures to
1198 [VOL. 87
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bated by the fact that, as the law currently stands, the attorney-client
privilege can be vitiated on the basis of a minimal evidentiary showing
in an ex parte proceeding in which the beneficiary of the privilege is
neither informed ofthe evidenceuponwhich the privilege is challengednor
given the opportunity to rebut the allegations as to why the privilege should
not apply.
This Article seeks a balance between protecting the significant social
interests served by the attorney-client privilege, and the legitimate interests
of litigants in obtaining evidence of crimes or frauds which are not entitled
to the protections of the privilege in the context of providing counsel to a
corporate client. To that end, Part I discusses the federal common law
basis 0 of the crime-fraud exception,2' Part II examines the procedure for
establishing the exception,' and Part Ill offers several concluding
observationsY3
In sum, despite being deeply rooted in law, courts (and prosecutors)
should be more hesitant and deliberate in their invocation of the crime-
fraud exception lest the privilege be swallowed by the exception in every
case in which a client is alleged to have committed a crime or fraud after
consulting with counsel.
I. THE CORPORATE ATtORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE AND THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
The privilege protecting the confidentiality of communications
between attorney and client arises when one communicates with a lawyer
the attorney could be used against her by means of forced disclosure from
the mouth of the attorney!
Stem & Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1804 (footnotes omitted). Such warnings can
only be expected to chill (to say the least) a client's willingness to be frank and
candid with the attorney.
20 Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules ofEvidence, "the privilege of a witness
... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."
FED. R. EVID. 501. Thus, in the course of adjudicating federal rights, questions of
privilege are governed by federal common law. See United States v. Zolin, 491
U.S. 554, 562 (1989); Clarke v. American Commerce Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d 127,
129 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1988).
21 See infra notes 24-113.
'See infra notes 114-77.
' See infra notes 178-9 1.
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in the course of an attorney-client relationship. 24 In the corporate setting,
however, the "client" is the corporate entity and not any of the human
constituents who act on behalf of the corporation.25 This distinction
between the client, a legal fiction,26 and those individuals through whom
24Wigmore formulated the rule as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2292 (emphasis in original not shown). The court in
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950),
agreed, saying:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by
his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and
(b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59.
1 Thus, for example, under Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Ethical Consideration 5-18 provides:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes
his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer,
employee, representative, or other person connected with the entity. In
advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his
professional judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires of
any person or organization.
MODELCODEOFPROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1983). Similarly, Model
Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides in part that "[a]
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting
through its duly authorized constituents." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1998).
26 See Flucke, supra note 4, at 551 ("In general, a corporation is an inanimate
and artificial entity created and governed by individual state law."); Gergacz, supra
note 10, at 1679 ("[A] corporation is an artificial entity, existing only in the eyes
of the law."); Ralph Jonas, Who is the Client?: The Corporate Lawyer's Dilemma,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 617, 617 (1988) ("A corporation is a legal fiction. Its indepen-
dent existence has been created out of statutory 'whole cloth.' Only by reason of
1200 [VOL. 87
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the corporation acts, imposes on the corporate counsel unique ethical duties
and concomitantly vexing issues as to what communications are subject to
the corporation's attorney-client privilege.' In like fashion, vitiating the
legislative fiat has this 'entity' been separated from its owners and its managers.");
James R. McCall, The Corporation as Client: Problems, Perspectives, and Partial
Solutions, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 626 (1988) ("While rigidly adopting the fiction
that corporations are 'persons' may produce some confusion, the basic structure of
English and American law was designed for regulating persons' activities. It is thus
inevitable that the law will view corporations, to the greatest possible degree, as if
these abstract entities were individuals."); Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn:
The Attorn ey-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV.
473, 475 (1987) ("The corporate client differs from the individual client in
important ways. The most obvious but critical difference is that corporations are
inanimate, artificial entities created by the state; they lack the human qualities-the
basic human dignity and rights-that our legal system recognizes and respects.").
27 Thus, it has been observed:
The [ABA Code of Professional Responsibility] is keyed to the relationship
between a lawyer and a client, but a corporate lawyer must deal not with an
entity as a client in abstraction but with individuals having authority to act
on behalf of the entity-employees, managers and officers, members of the
board of directors and, in some cases, controlling shareholders.
Brian D. Forrow, The Corporate Law Department Lawyer: Counsel to the Entity,
34 Bus. LAW. 1797, 1799 (1979). However, because the corporation has no will
of its own or capacity to act except through its human constituents-directors,
officers, employees, or stockholders-corporate counsel's relationship with those
who act on behalf of the corporation is fraught with ambiguity. Corporate counsel
regularly solicits information, often of a highly confidential nature, from
individuals associated with the corporation with whom corporate counsel deals and
then must segregate the interests of the individuals as manifestations of the
corporate client (which must be protected) from the individual interests of those
same persons (which the lawyer has no obligation to protect). Robert Kutak
observed, "No matter which way we approach it I think all recognize that an
attorney's duty runs to the corporation and this will require that the attorney act to
protect the interest of the corporate client apart from the interests of its many
constituents." Robert J. Kutak, Proposed Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, 36
Bus. LAW. 573, 577 (1981); see also Perlman, supra note 5, at 415 ("When a
lawyer represents a corporation he owes his primary allegiance to the corporate
entity, and not its agents, shareholders or any other person associated with the
corporation."). This situation has been described by one commentator as being
"perverse" in that the lawyer is engaged by, advises, and can be discharged by
persons who are not the lawyer's clients while the shareholders, who most closely




corporation's privilege on grounds that the communication was intended
to further an ongoing or future crime or fraud also requires a careful
analysis of the corporation's intent, if, indeed, anoncorporeal being can be
said to possess an "intent" in the first instance.2 8
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting
The availability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations has
been the subject of scholarly debate.29 Although recognition of a corporate
[W]e have the perverse situation in which the lawyer who represents a
publicly held corporation is selected and retained by, and reports to and
may be fired by, the principal officers and directors of the corporation-who
are not his clients. Moreover, the shareholders of a corporation, who,
collectively, are the owners of the mythical beast, typically do not
participate in the process by which the lawyer is selected, retained, or fired.
Jonas, supra note 26, at 617. Thus, "[g]iven the difficulty of accommodating the
corporation concept into the framework of a legal system premised upon individual
action, it is not surprising that the rules governing lawyers, the technicians of the
legal system, have been unclear on the subject of an attorneys' [sic] obligations to
corporate clients." McCall, supra note 26, at 626.28 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981).
29 It is arguable that the lawyer-client privilege, as a rule to encourage full
disclosure by eliminating the client's fear that his secrets will be told, has
no application where the client is an impersonal entity, such as a
corporation, and as such is free from human reticence and fear. Indeed,
because of their impersonal nature, corporations have been denied the
protection of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. But,
unlike the privilege against self-incrimination, the lawyer-client privilege
does not exist out of deference to any personal right. Rather, it is a rule of
policy designed to facilitate the workings ofjustice. Viewed in this light, it
appears that the policy of the privilege gives it full application to corporate
communications, since the group of agents and directors who motivate a
corporation need the incentive of the privilege fully as much as do the
private clients to encourage full disclosure to counsel.
Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 241 (footnote omitted); see
also David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65
YALE L.J. 953, 990 (1956) ("The more deeply one is convinced of the social
necessity ofpermitting corporations to consult frankly and privately with their legal
advisers, the more willing one should be to accord them a flexible and generous
protection."). Cf James A. Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of
Corporate Clients-Paradox or Public Policy?, 40 U. DET. L. REv. 299 (1963)
(arguing that the attorney-client privilege should not extend to corporate clients);
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privilege is relatively recent in the federal courts, 30 the question was settled
by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Company v. United States.3'
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court made it clear that the corporate attorney-
client privilege was not confined to the "control group"'32 of the entity, but
instead, the privilege extends to communications at all levels of the
corporation.33 Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege will attach if-
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTREDAME L.REv. 157 (1993); Note, FixedRules,
supra note 5, at 473.
30 The applicability of the attorney-client privilege to corporations appears to
have been assumed for many years. See, e.g., United States v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915). However, it was not until the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320
F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963), that a corporate attorney-client privilege was
specifically recognized. See Simon, supra note 29, at 953 ("It is generally assumed
that corporations and other legal entities are entitled to the privilege just as much
as individuals are. The idea seems to go unchallenged-perhaps because in law, as
in life, many of the most deeply believed assumptions are unspoken.").
31 See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 397; see also In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d
482,487 (2dCir. 1982) ("Upjohn affirmed the 'assumption' that a corporation may
assert the privilege on its behalf.").
32 The "control group test" for applying the attorney-client privilege to cor-
porate communications was formulated in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483,485 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See generally Waldman, supra note
26, at 481-84; Howard N. Wollitz, Comment, The Privileged Few: The Attorney-
Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 20 UCLA L. REV. 288, 297-303
(1972). The "control group test" was rejected by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co.
because it "overlooks the fact that the privilege exists to protect not only the giving
of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information
to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice." Upjohn Co., 449
U.S. at 390; see Stephen A. Brown & Paul M. Hyman, The Scope of the Attorney-
Client Privilege in Corporate Decision Making, 26 Bus. LAW., 1145, 1148-49
(1971); BrysonP. Burnham, TheAttorney-ClientPrivilege in the CorporateArena,
24 BuS.LAW. 901,906-08 (1969); Flucke, supra note 4, at 554-55; Perlman, supra
note 5, at 409-11; Waldman, supra note 26, at 489-91.
33 As the Supreme Court stated in Upjohn:
In the case of the individual client the provider of information and the
person who acts on the lawyer's advice are one and the same. In the
corporate context, however, it will frequently be employees beyond the
control group as defined by the court below--'officers and agents...
responsible for directing [the company's] actions in response to legal
advice"-who will possess the information needed by the corporation's
lawyers. Middle-level-and indeed lower-level-employees can, by actions
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1) the communication was made to corporate counsel, acting as such; 2) the
communication was made at the direction of management in orderto secure
legal advice from counsel; 3) the communication concernedamatter within
the scope of the employee's duties; and 4) at the time the communication
was made, the employee was aware that the communication was for the
purpose of rendering legal advice to the corporation. 4
Upjohn also makes clear that the privilege protects both the communi-
cation of legal advice and the gathering of information upon which
the advice is given .3 This protection extends to corporate internal
investigations of possible wrongdoing36 as well as to communications in
the course of day-to-day corporate counseling." The privilege protects
only those communications that are primarily for the purpose of ob-
taining legal advice, not business advice,38 although it is recognized that
within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious
legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have the
relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately to
advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties.
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 391.
34 See id. at 394; see also Massing, supra note 8, at 1195.
3 See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 390.
36 See id. at 383; United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996); In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504,510 (2d Cir. 1979); Diversified Indus., Inc.
v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir., 1977) (en bane); In re Leslie Fay Cos.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89
F.R.D. 595, 600-01 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
31 See United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1996).
Much of what lawyers actually do for a living consists of helping their
clients comply with the law. Clients unwittingly engage in conduct subject
to civil and even criminal penalties. This valuable social service of
counseling clients and bringing them into compliance with the law cannot
be performed effectively if clients are scared to tell their lawyers what they
are doing, for fear their lawyers will be turned into government informants.
Id. at 1500 (citations omitted).
38 One commentator explained:
It is a basic principle that the privilege extends only to confidential
communications made by the client to his lawyer acting as such.
Accordingly, it does not protect disclosures made to a person who happens
to be a lawyer but is not acting in that capacity. This aspect of the privilege
raises difficulties when applied to lawyers who, as advisers to businessmen,
participate in business decisions. The problem is particularly perplexing for
the legal advisers of today's corporate giants .... Indeed, corporate
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attorneys are often employees, directors, or officers of their clients. Whether
they be "outside" counsel or "house" counsel, they can rarely confine
themselves to purely legal matters. Questions of policy, as well as executive
guidance for matters that are partly legal, often fall within their domain.
There is hardly a corporate record or memorandum of any importance that
does not pass through their hands at one time or another.
Simon, supra note 29, at 969; see Flucke, supra note 4, at 556 ("To assert the
privilege, corporations must clearly demonstrate that the communications to be
protected were given in a professional legal capacity and that they concern legal
rather than business matters. However, corporate dealings are not made
confidential merely by funneling them routinely through an attorney.") (footnote
omitted); Susan F. Jennison, The Crime or Fraud Exception to theAttorney-Client
Privilege: Marc Rich and the Second Circuit, 51 BROOK: L. REV. 913, 932-33
(1985) ("In order for the attorney-client privilege to apply, the attorney must be
acting in his or her capacity as an attorney, and not as a business advisor.")
(footnotes omitted). Thus, the proponent of the privilege must show, as an initial
matter, that the communication was for the purpose of obtaining legal counsel and
notbusiness advice. See, e.g.,United States v. Abrahams, 905 F.2d 1276,1283 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("[The attorney] failed to introduce evidence that his clients had
communicated this information in confidence and in order to seek legal advice.
Absent such evidence, the claim of privilege must fail."); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he privilege is
triggered only by a client's request for legal, as contrasted with business, advice.");
In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The purpose of the privilege is
to protect and foster the client's freedom of expression. It is not to permit an
attorney to conduct his client's business affairs in secret."); Colton v. United States,
306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962) ("Attorneys frequently give to their clients
business or other advice which, as least insofar as it can be separated from their
essentially professional legal services, gives rise to no privilege whatever."); United
States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) ("What is vital to the privilege
is that the communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal
advicefirom the lawyer."); McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234,238 (N.D.
Cal. 1990) ("No privilege can attach to any communication as to which a business
purpose would have served as a sufficient cause, i.e., any communication that
would have been made because of a business purpose, even if there had been no
perceived additional interest in securing legal advice."); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc.,
68 F.R.D. 361, 367 (D. Del. 1975) ("Where house counsel is engaged in giving
business advice or mere technical information, no privilege attaches."). Similarly,
compilations of information from nonprivileged sources for a business purpose,
even if prepared by an attorney, will not be considered privileged. See, e.g.,
Abrahams, 905 F.2d at 1284 (upholding denial of privilege for questionnaire
responses for purpose of preparing tax returns); United States v. El Paso Co., 682
F.2d 530, 541 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding as nonprivileged a tax pool analysis
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protected professional advice may serve a business purpose.39
prepared forfinancial reportingpurposes); In reFischel, 557 F.2d at212 (affirming
finding that summaries of transactions with third parties were not privileged);
American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D. Del.
1962) (finding an analysis of patents to be unprivileged). Thus, communications
with a lawyer, as a friend, would not be privileged, see Modem Woodmen of Am.
v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352,354 (5th Cir. 1942), nor would any communication with
a lawyer as a parent, see In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400, 403-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Instead, the communications must have been with a lawyer acting as such. See
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 394. One court observed:
Since the privilege is intended to facilitate the rendition of legal
representation, it does not cover communications with the attorney if
intended to assist counsel in performing other services, such as the
provision of business advice or the performance of such functions as
negotiating purely commercial aspects of a business relationship.
Note Funding Corp. v. Bobian Investment Co., No. 93 Civ. 7427, 1995 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 16605, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1995). For that reason, no attorney-client
relationship was found to exist where the lawyer and the client were in business
together, see United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705, 714 (2d Cir. 1973); Lowy
v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1959); or where the attorney
effectively controlled the corporation, see United States v. Faltico, 586 F.2d 1267,
1269-70 (8th Cir. 1978); or was a director of the corporation, see Securities Exch.
Comm'n v. Gulf& Western Indus., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 675, 683 (D.D.C. 1981);
United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D. Del. 1943).
Likewise, the privilege has not been recognized when counsel's activities were not
primarily those of a lawyer, as when counsel acted as a "scrivener," see Pollock v.
United States, 202 F.2d 281,286 (5th Cir. 1953); Gu/f& Western Indus., Inc., 518
F. Supp. at 683; as a conduit for client's funds, see United States v. Horvath, 731
F.2d 557, 561 (8th Cir. 1984); as a transfer agent, see United States v. Palmer, 536
F.2d 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 1976); as an accountant, see Olender v. United States,
210 F.2d 795, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1954); as a claims investigator, see Bird v.
Pennsylvania Cent. Co., 61 F.RtD. 43, 46 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1973); as a business
advisor, see United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 (5th Cir. 1981); as a
marketing advisor, see In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 640 (9th Cir. 1980); as a negotiator, see Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis
671, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1996); Attorney General v. Covington &
Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (D.D.C. 1977); or as a lobbyist, see North
Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 110 F.R.D. 511,
517 (M.D.N.C. 1986).
39Thus, in Note Funding Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16605, at *6-7, the court
noted:
In pursuing large and complex financial transactions, commercial entities
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The privilege has been held to attach equally to both in-house counsel
and outside counsel. However, because of their unique position as both
often seek the assistance of attorneys who are well equipped both by
training and by experience to assess the risks and advantages in alternative
business strategies. When providing this assistance, counsel are not limited
to offering their client purely abstract advice as to the rules of law that may
apply to their situation. Of necessity, counsel will often be required to
assess specific tactics in putting together transactions or shaping the terms
of commercial agreements, and their evaluation of alternative approaches
may well take into account not only the potential impact of applicable legal
norms, but also the commercial needs of their client and the financial
benefits or risks of these alternative strategies.
The fact that an attorney's advice encompasses commercial as well as
legal considerations does not vitiate the privilege. If the attorney's advice
is sought, at least in part, because of his legal expertise and the advice rests
"predominantly" on his assessment of the requirements imposed, or the
opportunities offered, by applicable rules of law, he is performing the
function of a lawyer.
Id. Judge Wyzanski had made a similar observation in UnitedStates v. UnitedShoe
Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
The modem lawyer almost invariably advises his client upon not only what
is permissible but also what is desirable. And it is in the public interest that
the lawyer should regard himself as more than predicter of legal
consequences. His duty to society as well as to his client involves many
relevant social, economic, political and philosophical considerations. And
the privilege of nondisclosure is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal
considerations are expressly stated in a communication which also includes
legal advice.
Id. at 359; accord In re LTVSec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. at 601 ("Information gathered
in such a manner as to be privileged does not become discoverable solely because
management makes other business use of the information."); see also Flucke, supra
note 4, at 565 ("The mere fact that business advice or other nonlegal advice is
simply incorporated into legal advice does not vitiate the attorey-client
privilege."); Gergacz, supra note 10, at 1680. Gergacz states:
One of the general requirements of the attorey-client privilege is that the
communications with an attorney be for the purpose of securing legal
advice. However, there is no set formula or list which clearly defines the
contours of legal advice. Often lawyers' communications with clients will
involve legal as well as nonlegal considerations. This factor alone will not
cause the privilege to fail.
Id.
o As Judge Wyzanski also stated:
[T]he apparent factual differences between these house counsel and outside
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lawyers and employees of the corporation, in-house counsel are often
called upon to provide business advice as well as legal counsel."1 For this
counsel are that the former are paid annual salaries, occupy offices in the
corporation's buildings, and are employees rather than independent
contractors. These are not sufficient differences to distinguish the two types
of counsel for purposes of the attorney-client privilege. And this is apparent
when attention is paid to the realities of modern corporate law practice. The
type of service performed by house counsel is substantially like that
performed by many members of the large urban law firms. The distinction
is chiefly that the house counsel gives advice to one regular client, the
outside counsel to several regular clients.
United States Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 360; accordIn re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d
94,99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The lawyerwhose testimony the government seeks in this
case served as in-house attorney. That status alone does not dilute the privilege.");
Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968) (opining that members of in-
house law department are "within the ambit of the confidential communications
rule."); In reLTVSec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. at 601 ("Whatever doubt may have existed,
Upjohn laid to rest suggestions that house counsel are to be treated differently from
outside counsel with respect to activities in which they are engaged as attorneys.");
O'Brien v. Board of Educ. of City Sch. Dist., 86 F.R.D. 548,549 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
("The fact that [a] document was prepared by in-house counsel rather than by an
independent attorney is of no siguificance."); Valente, 68 F.R.D. at 367 ("This
Court has long adhered to the rule that house counsel are to be treated in the same
fashion as outside counsel with respect to activities in which they are engaged as
attorneys."); Malco Mfg. Co. v. Elco Corp., 45 F.R.D. 24, 26 (D. Minn. 1968)
("The weight of authority appears to be that legal advice rendered to a corporation
by an attorney in its employ as so-called "house" counsel falls within the rule of
attorney-client privilege."); 8 in 1 Pet Products, Inc. v. Swift & Co., 218 F. Supp.
253 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ("It is also clear that legal advice rendered to a corporation
by an attorney in its employ falls within the attorney-client privilege."); Georgia
Pac. Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463,464 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) ("House counsel are required to have the same degree of training, skill,
knowledge and professional integrity as outside counsel."); see Flucke, supra note
4, at 559; Michael Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing Corporate Crime: The
Dilemma ofInternal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1, 24 n.108 (1997).
41 Thus, it has been observed that in-house counsel
may serve as company officers with mixed business-legal responsibility;
whether or not officers, their day-to-day involvement may blur the line
between legal and nonlegal communications; and their advice may originate
not in response to the client's consultation about a particular problem but
with them, as part of an on-going, permanent relationship with the
organization.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5125, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 671, at *9-10, summ. j. granted by 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12811
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reason, assertions of privilege for communications with in-house counsel
do not enjoy the same presumption of privilege afforded to communica-
tions with outside counsel.42 Instead, communications with in-house
counsel have been subjected to stricter and more skeptical scrutiny than
similar communications with outside counsel.43
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996).
42 See United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996).
[A] matter committed to a professional legal adviser is prima facie so
committed for the sake of the legal advice which may be more or less
desirable for some aspect of the matter, and is therefore within the privilege
unless it clearly appears to be lacking in aspects requiring legal advice.
Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2296, at 566-67)); see also Diversified
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Here, the matter was
committed to... a professional legal adviser. Thus, it was prima facie committed
for the sake of legal advice and was, therefore, within the privilege absent a clear
showing to the contrary."); see also United States v. Chevron Corp., No. C-94-
1885, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4154, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1996) ("[T]he
presumption is logical since outside counsel would not ordinarily be involved in
the business decisions of a corporation."); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
Am., 121 F. Su'pp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954) ("'Outside counsel' for corporations
almost invariably, and 'house counsel' ordinarily, qualify [as acting as a lawyer].").
However, in the case of in-house counsel, one commentator has suggested:
Because attorneys often participate in corporate affairs in other than a
purely legal capacity, rendering commercial and even technical advice, it
is frequently more difficult to determine whether aprofessional relationship
has been established between a corporation and an attorney than a
conventional lawyer-client relationship. For this reason, a professional
relationship cannot be presumed from the mere fact of consultation, by a
corporation, as it is when an individual consults with an attorney.
Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 244. In addition, at least one
court has noted the possibility of an implicit conflict between the in-house lawyer's
desire to see the company prosper and the lawyer's ethical and legal obligations.
See In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982).
The !awyers' professional relationship to the corporation may extend well
beyond aspects relating to criminal liability and leave them torn between a
desire to see the firm prosper and their professional and legal obligations.
In such cases, the wiser course may be to hire counsel with no other
connection to the corporation to conduct investigations ....
Id. at 491.
43 As noted in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAFRoofing, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
671, at *9, "[w]here the communication in issue.., is from an in-house attorney
to management, difficult fact specific questions are involved." Id. Thus, a
corporation asserting the privilege with respect to communications with in-house
counsel has been required to make a clear showing that the communication was in
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Even though the corporation enjoys the full protection of the attorney-
client privilege for its confidential communications, unlike the individual
attorney-client relationship, a corporation must communicate with its
attorney through one or more of its employees.' The acts of any of these
employees may subject the corporation to criminal and civil liability even
though the senior management of the corporation neither intended nor
condoned the misconduct.4 Indeed, even a low-level employee can consult
furtherance of an attorney-client relationship and not in the capacity of business
advisor. See In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94,99 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The [c]ompany
can shelter [in-house counsel's] advice only upon a clear showing that [in-house
counsel] gave it in a professional legal capacity."); Chevron Corp., 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4154, at *9 ("While an attorney's status as in-house counsel does not dilute
the attorney-client privilege..., a corporation must make a clear showing that in-
house counsel's advice was given in a professional capacity.") (citations omitted);
see also Flucke, supra note 4, at 556 ("To assert the privilege, corporations must
clearly demonstrate that the communications to be protected were given in a
professional legal capacity and that they concern legal rather than business matters.
However, corporate dealings are not made confidential merely by funneling them
routinely through an attorney.") (footnotes omitted).
4 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,348
(1985) ("As an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through agents. A
corporation cannot speak directly to its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot directly waive
the privilege when disclosure is in its best interest.").
I A corporation is subject to liability for the acts of employees in the course of
employment which are at least arguably intended to benefit the corporation. See
New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493,
af'd, 212 U.S. 500 (1909) (holding corporation liable for employee's payment of
illegal rebates for sugar shipments); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d
1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding corporation liable under the Sherman Act for
participation by a hotel purchasing agent in boycott of suppliers who did not
contribute to a trade association). Moreover, vicarious liability is not confined to
the acts of senior managers. Instead, corporate liability can result from the actions
of mid-level managers. See United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,
882 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding company liable for act of regional
distribution manager who engaged in "block booking" in violation of permanent
injunction); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding
company liable for acts of treasurer and a dispatcher engaged in a scheme to
defraud the U.S. Army by charging for undelivered heating oil); United States v.
Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding company liable for acts of
district sales manager engaged in bid-rigging); United States v. Cadillac Overall
Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1978) (attaching liability for acts of sales
manager engaged in conspiracy to allocate customers); Continental Baking Co. v.
United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960) (holding company liable for plant
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with the corporation's counsel and thereafter commit a crime or perpetrate
a fraud, thereby subjecting the corporation to liability without the
knowledge or acquiescence of those who are responsible for conducting the
affairs of the corporation.6
manager's price-fixing activities); United States v. Van Riper, 154 F.2d 492 (3d
Cir. 1946) (finding corporate liability for gasoline station manager's violation of
Office of Price Administration Regulations); C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150
F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945) (holding lender liable for branch manager's conspiracy to
violate the National Housing Act).
46 Corporations have long been held vicariously liable even for the acts of low-
level employees. See United States v. Bank ofNew England, 821 F.2d 844 (lst Cir.
1987) (holding bank liable for head tellers' failure to report currency transactions);
United States v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding
company liable when employees falsified records to conceal violations of FDA
regulations); United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding
optometrist liable for employees' submission of false insurance claims); United
States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding bank liable when bank
employees failed to report currency transactions); Apex Oil Co. v. United States,
530 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding corporate liability when oil facility
employees failed to report oil spill); United States v. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc.,
464 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1972) (attaching corporate liability whentruck drivers left
explosives unattended); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. United States, 406 F.2d 771 (9th Cir.
1969) (holding car dealer liable when employees removed manufacturers' labels
from windshields); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962)
(holding oil company liable for employee's falsification of "run tickets" from oil
pumping station); United States v. Chicago Express, Inc., 273 F.2d 751 (7th Cir.
1960) (attaching corporate liability when truck driver failed to post signs that truck
carried poison); Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958) (finding
corporate liability when truck terminal clerk failed to report violations of ICC
limits on operation of motor vehicles); United States v. Milton Marks Corp., 240
F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957) (holding corporation liable where general foreman caused
defective goods to be shipped to the government); St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v.
United States, 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955) (attaching liability for clerk's failure
to properly label shipping papers for goods classified by ICC as dangerous); Inland
Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951) (holding trucking
company liable when truck drivers prepared false logs and trip reports); United
States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948) (attaching corporate liability
for salesman requiring tie-in sales in violation of price controls); United States v.
George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding corporation liable where
salesman was engaged in tying agreements in violation of Emergency Price Control
Act); The President Coolidge, 101 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939) (holding company
liable when deck hand illegally dumped refuse overboard); John Gund Brewing Co.
v. United States, 204 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1913) (attaching corporate liability when
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In these circumstances, the analysis of the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege currently employed by the courts, which focuses
on the intent of the client in seeking legal counsel, does not fit precisely.
Indeed, even though the law of vicarious corporate liability is to the effect
that the intent of the miscreant employee generally will be imputed to the
corporation, 7 it strains reason to suggest that when a low-level employee
salesman violated liquor laws by processing fictitious orders); see generally H.
Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts of Their
Employees andAgents, 41 LOY. L. REV. 279 (1995).
47Notwithstanding long-standing judicial precedent that corporations could be
held liable for knowing and willful violations of the criminal law, see United States
v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909) (finding corporation capable of
willful failure to maintain required books and records); Joplin Mercantile Co. v.
United States, 213 F. 926, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1914) (holding that a corporation could
be charged with conspiracy); United States v. New York Herald Co., 159 F. 296,
297 (S.D.N.Y. 1907) (finding that a corporation could be liable for knowing
deposit of obscene material in the U.S. Mail); United States v. John Kelso Co., 86
F. 304,306 (N.D. Cal. 1898) (finding corporation capable ofintentionally violating
law limiting hours of labor), there has been scholarly debate over whether a
corporation can formulate criminal intent, see Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos:
A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095,
1097 (1991) ("Traditionally, the criminal law has been reserved for intentional
violations of the law. Yet, our prosecutions of corporations have been marked by
floundering efforts to identify the intent of intangible, fictional entities.") (footnotes
omitted); Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents, 60
HARV. L. REv. 283, 284 (1946) ("Instead of regarding the problem as one of
vicarious liability, however, the courts have stumbled over the theoretical
difficulties of ascribing criminal intent to a corporation.") (footnote omitted).
Indeed, as Professor Gerhard O.W. Mueller has observed:
Many weeds have grown on the acre of jurisprudence which has been
allotted to the criminal law. Among these weeds is a hybrid of vicarious
liability, absolute liability, an inkling of mens rea-though a rather
degenerated mens rea-, a few genes from tort law and a few from the law
of business associations. This weed is called corporate criminal
liability .... Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just
grew.
Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model
Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 21,21
(1957).
Nevertheless, courts have consistently held that the knowledge and intent of
corporate employees, acting within the scope of their employment, will be
attributed to the corporation, thereby providing the basis for ascribing to the
corporate the requisite criminal intent. See Bank ofNewEngland, 821 F.2d at 856
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consults counsel and then commits a crime or fraud, the corporation (i.e.,
the attorney's client) intended to commit a crime or fraud at the time the
employee consulted with counsel or that counsel's advice was sought by
the corporation in furtherance of that crime or fraud.4"
As a result, because the attorney's intent and knowledge of the
individual's purposes in seeking counsel are largely irrelevant to the
applicability of the crime-fraud exception, the attorney cannot assure
either the corporate client or the individual employee that the confidential-
ity of their communications will be respected in a future proceeding."0
(attributing collective knowledge of bank's employees concerning individual
depositor's cash transactions to the corporation); see also Brown, supra note 46,
at 296-306.
48 Of course, the confidentiality of the communication with respect to the
employee may not be protected. See Massing, supra note 8, at 1197.
49 See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); United States v. Chen, 99
F.3d 1495, 1504 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381-
82 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 540 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury (G.J.
No. 87-03-A), 845 F.2d 896, 898 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Soudan, 812
F.2d 920, 927 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287,292 (5th Cir.
1986); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury
SubpoenaDuces Tecum Dated Sept. 15,1983,731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 n.2 (1lth Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Juiry
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Hodge & Zweig,
548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 909
(8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971). But see In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 773 F.2d 204, 207 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding
that mere failure to include documents with subpoenaed material was not enough
to remove privilege without some showing of intent on part of attorneys).
50 Different considerations apply with respect to attorney work product,
however. In general, the crime-fraud exception applies to the doctrine protecting
attorney work product from discovery by third parties. As one court explained:
[Tihe two privileges are separate and distinct, but there is also an overlap.
Information furnished by the client to the lawyer may merge into his work
product; moreover, the overriding purpose of the two privileges is the
same-to encourage proper functioning of the adversary system. From this
viewpoint, there is no actual inconsistency in applying the crime-fraud
exception to the work product as well as to the attorney-client privilege. The
rationale supporting the exception in both areas is virtually identical. The
work product privilege is perverted if it is used to further illegal activities
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as is the attorney-client privilege, and there are no overpowering
considerations in either situation that would justify the shielding of evidence
that aids continuing or future criminal activity.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 802 (footnotes omitted); accord In re
Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518,524 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Antitrust Grand Jury,
805 F.2d 155, 164 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d at 399 n.4; In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 723 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983); In re International
Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982); In re
Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d
482, 492 (2d Cir. 1982). Accordingly, authority addressing the crime-fraud
exception in regard to attorney-client communications and attorney work product
will be cited herein interchangeably.
However, unlike the attorney-client privilege, which inures solely to the benefit
of the client, the work product doctrine benefits both attorneys and clients by
protecting not only communications but also attorney thought processes and
analysis in anticipation of litigation. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 401 (1981); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342,348
(4th Cir. 1994); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 941,945 (10th Cir. 1984);
In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d at 1242. As such,
the protection of the work-product doctrine is broader than those of the attorney-
client privilege. See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238 n.1 1; In reAntitrust Grand Jury, 805
F.2d at 163; In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 808; Moody v. Internal Revenue Serv.,
654 F.2d 795, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 337 (8th Cir.
1977). Also, in contrast to the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine
may be asserted by either the client or the attorney whose work product is sought,
and a waiver by the client will not deprive the attorney of the benefits of the
doctrine. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1994); In
re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (I), 640 F.2d 49, 63 (7th Cir. 1980).
Courts distinguish between "fact" work product and "opinion" work product.
In essence, "fact" work product is written or oral information conveyed to the
attorney. "Opinion" work product covers any material reflecting the attorney's
mental impressions, opinions, analyses, conclusions, legal theories or judgments.
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d at 348; In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805
F.2d at 163. Fact work product is subject to disclosure on a showing of "substantial
need," whereas disclosure of opinion work product is reserved for "compelling
circumstances." See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d at 348; In re John Doe
Corp., 675 F. 2d at 492-93; In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1078 (4th Cir. 1981); In re
Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d at 62; Goldsmith & King, Policing
Corporate Crime: The Dilemma oflnternal Compliance Programs, supra note 40,
at 29-30. A showing that an attorney's services were used by the client in
furtherance of a crime or fraud is sufficient to defeat the protection for fact work
product. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d at 803. It is only where the
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Thus, in virtually every substantive exchange between a corporate attorney
and an individual employee, there is the prospect that the attorney-client
privilege will be pierced at a later time and that counsel may become a
witness against the corporate client.
B. The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege
The protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege do not extend
to communications with a lawyer which are intended to be in furtherance
of a presently occurring or planned ilegality.5 1 At common law, as
attorney was a knowing participant in the client's unlawful scheme, however, that
"opinion" work product will be subject to disclosure. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 33 F.3d at 349; In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at 164; Earl J.
Silbert, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-
Product Doctrine, The Lawyer's Obligations of Disclosure, and the Lawyer's
Response to Accusation of Wrongful Conduct, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351, 357
(1985) ("[T]he consensus among federal courts is that client fraud vitiates any work
product privilege the client may claim, but an innocent attorney can assert the
privilege for his opinion work product. If both the attorney and the client are
involved in fraud, neither can assert the privilege."). Thus, unlike the crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege, the attorney's culpability is highly
relevant to the extent of the work product doctrine where there is a showing of
client crime or fraud.
" This was explained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings as follows:
While there is a societal interest in enabling clients to obtain complete and
accurate legal advice, which we serve by sheltering confidential
communications between client and attorney from public consumption,
there is no such interest when the client consults the attorney to further the
commission of a crime or fraud. Thus, the crime-fraud exception insures
that the confidentiality enveloping the attorney-client relationship does not
encompass communications "made for the purpose of getting advice for the
commission of a fraud or crime[ ]."
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d at 381 (citations omitted); accord
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 95, at 229 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)
("Since the policy of the privilege is that of promoting the administration ofjustice,
it would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it to the client who seeks advice
to aid him in carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme."); Fried, supra note 13,
at 443-44 ("The privilege ends when the client seeks to involve the attorney in
wrongdoing. It also ends when the client takes advantage of legal counsel to plan
a crime or fraud, perhaps by tailoring evidence or testimony to the requirements of
law that the client has learned from his or her attorney."); Gergacz, supra note 10,
at 1676 ("Since the privilege is based on public policy and justice considerations,
abuse of those considerations will cause the privilege to fail. This occurs when the
1998-99] 1215
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
exemplifiedby cases such asAnnesley v. Earl ofAngleseal2 and The Queen
v. Cox andRailton,s communications in furtherance of a present or future
client's communication with an attorney is to further a plan to commit a crime or
perpetrate a fraud. In such a situation, the client loses the privilege.") (footnotes
omitted).
2 Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 How. St. Trials 1139 (1743). The action
was one of ejectment in which James Annesley claimed special title to the largest
estate in England then being occupied by the Earl of Anglesea. The basis of his
claim was that he was the son and rightful heir of Arthur Baron Altham, the
deceased brother of the then-Earl, who had died in Ireland sixteen years earlier. See
Fried, supra note 13, at 447.
Annesley alleged that his father, Baron Altham, had abandoned him to the
streets of Dublin when he was seven years old at the insistence of his father's
mistress. With the connivance of his uncle, the Earl, Annesley was kidnapped and
indentured in the West Indies for thirteen years. He was able to secure his return
to England by shipping with the Royal Navy as a common seaman. See id.
Shortly after his return to England, Annesley was involved in a hunting
accident in which a gamekeeper was killed. Seizing upon the opportunity to again
remove Annesley from the scene (and from contention for his inheritance), the Earl
commissioned John Giffard, his attorney of long-standing, to prosecute Annesley
for murder. In due course, Annesley was tried for the murder of the gamekeeper,
but the jury returned a verdict of" 'death by chance-medley,"' accidental death,
and Annesley was acquitted. Id. at 448 (quoting Trial of Annesley & Redding, 17
How. St. Trials 1094 (1742)).
At the time of the ejectment action, the key witness for Annesley was Giffard,
the Earl's attorney. Giffard was permitted to testify to conversations he had had
with his client, the Earl, preceding the murder prosecution in which the Earl had
acknowledged that Annesley was the son of his brother, the Baron, and that he
would pay £10,000 to have Annesley hanged. It took the court less than two hours
to find for Annesley. Although the facts of the case and the arguments of
Annesley's counsel suggest that Giffard's testimony was allowed in spite of the
attorney-client privilege, the court indicated that it considered the Earl's comments
about wanting to see Annesley hanged as being a conversation with a friend rather
than with a professional. See id.; see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2298, at
574-77; Hazard, supra note 1, at 1073-80.
" The Queen v. Cox & Railton, 14 Q.B.D. 153 (Q.B. 1884). The Annesley
decision appears to have been largely ignored and the crime-fraud exception
undeveloped until this decision. See Fried, supra note 13, at 450-56; Hazard, supra
note 1, at 1080-86. Cox was a case of criminal fraud against creditors. See Fried,
supra note 13, at 456-57. Railton had consented to the entry of ajudgment against
him for liability which carried with it an assessment of substantial costs. Cox and
Railton were partners in a newspaper business which they hoped to shield from
Railton's judgment creditors. See Cox & Railton, 14 Q.B.D. at 153.
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crime or fraud were not considered to be within the bounds of the privilege
because the purpose of the communication, in the first instance, was not to
obtain legal advice in good faith.'
Cox and Railton consulted with an attorney who advised them that only a sale
of Railton's interest to a bona fide purchaser would put the partnership assets
beyond the reach of the judgment and that a sale between Railton and Cox would
not be bona fide because of the partnership. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1087. Cox
and Railton then prepared a memorandum dissolving the partnership which they
back-dated prior to the assessment of costs. See Cox & Railton, 14 Q.B.D. at 153.
At the trial, the attorney was permitted to testify concerning his conversation
with Cox and Railton and his advice that a sale of the assets to Cox would not be
bona fide. In this regard, the attorney testified that Railton had asked whether
anyone knew of the partnership other than the attorney. The attorney had answered
that no one other than his clerks knew. See id. at 156. Admission of the testimony
was upheld, the court noting:
In order that the [privilege] may apply there must be both professional
confidence and professional employment, but if the client has a criminal
object in view in his communications with his solicitor one of these
elements must necessarily be absent The client must either conspire with
his solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is avowed, the client does
not consult his adviser professionally, because it cannot be the solicitor's
business to further any criminal object. If the client does not avow his
object he reposes no confidence, for the state of facts, which is the
foundation of the supposed confidence, does not exist.
Id. at 168.
54David I. Fried observed:
The court here made a bold play upon the word "confidence." Vice
Chancellor Cranworth, among others, previously had said that there is no
privilege except for "what passes between [client and solicitor] in
professional confidence." This statement is entirely consistent with the
Annesley approach: there can be no professional confidence when the
attorney is either invited to participate in a fraud, which is no part of the
attorney's professional role, or when the attorney is told some fact not
needed to perform a professional function.
The Cox court, however, for the first time conceived that the client has
a role to play. No professional confidence existed because the clients failed
to take the attorney into their confidence. Because the privilege is intended
to make perfect frankness possible, there is no privilege unless the client is
perfectly frank. The court equated the technical requirement of
"confidentiality," which both before and since the Cox decision has meant
that no one but the client and his or her attorney is privy to the
communication, with the meaning of the word in ordinary speech. The
crime-fraud exception in its modem form, with its focus on the client's
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Today, communications which would otherwise be considered
privileged (i.e., communications with an attorney, acting as such, for the
purpose of obtaining legal counsel) are excepted from the privilege if the
communication furthers an ongoing or future crime.55 Indeed, it is to
prevent abuse of the secrecy accorded bona fide attorney-client communi-
cations that the modem crime-fraud exception has been fashioned. 6
intention, was born of the rhetorical figure.
Fried, supra note 13, at 458 (footnotes omitted).
55 The Supreme Court explained in United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989):
The attorney-client privilege must necessarily protect the confidences of
wrongdoers, but the reason for the protection-the centrality of open client
and attorney communication to the proper functioning of our adversary
system ofjustice-"ceas[es] to operate at a certain point, namely, where the
desired advice refers not to prior wrongdoing, but tofiture wrongdoing."
Id. at 562-63 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2298, at 573); accord In re
Sealed Case, 754 F.2d at 399 ("Communications otherwise protected by the
attorney-client privilege are not protected if the communications are made in
furtherance of a crime, fraud, or other misconduct."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15,1983,731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It is well
established that communications that otherwise would be protectedby the attorney-
client privilege or the attorney work product privilege are not protected if they
relate to client communications in furtherance of contemplated or ongoing criminal
or fraudulent conduct.").
56 See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563 ("It is the purpose of the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege to assure that the'seal of secrecy' between lawyer and
client does not extend to communications 'made for the purpose of getting advice
for the commission of a fraud' or crime.") (citations omitted); Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) ("There is a privilege protecting communications
between attorney and client. The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A
client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of
a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told."); In re Sealed
Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The relationship between client and
counsel may, however, be abused. And so the attorney-client privilege is subject
to what is known as the crime-fraud exception."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
87 F.3d at 381 ("[T]he crime fraud exception insures that the confidentiality
enveloping the attorney-client relationship does not encompass communications
made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud or crime.")
(citations omitted); In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995).
Although there is a societal interest in enabling clients to get sound legal
advice, there is no such interest when the communications or advice are
intended to further the commission of a crime or fraud. The crime-fraud
exception thus insures that the secrecy protecting the attorney-client
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The crime or fraud that the communication is intended to further must
be either presently occurring or planned for the future. 7 Communications
relationship does not extend to communications or work product "'made
for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud' or crime."
Id. (quoting Zolin, 491 U.S. at 563); see also In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 627
(7th Cir. 1988) ("When the privilege shelters important knowledge, accuracy
declines. Litigants may use secrecy to cover up machinations, to get around the law
instead of complying with it. Secrecy is useful to the extent it facilitates the candor
necessary to obtain legal advice. The privilege extends no further."); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d at 1038
("[Clonfidentiality of communications ... facilitates the rendering of sound legal
advice, advice in furtherance ofa fraudulent or unlawful goal cannot be considered
'sound.' Rather advice in furtherance of such goals is socially perverse, and the
client's communications seeking such advise are not worthy of protection.");
United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Where a client seeks to
use an attorney to further a continuing or future crime or fraud the broader public
interest in the administration of justice is being frustrated, not promoted."); In re
Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 555 (8th Cir. 1980) ("When the attorney-client
relationship has been ... abused we perceive no justification for sustaining the
privilege in any context."); MCCORMICKONEVIDENCE, supra note 5 1, § 95, at229
("Since the policy of the privilege is that of promoting the administration ofjustice,
it would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it to the client who seeks advice
to aid him in carrying out an illegal or fraudulent scheme.").
57 See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562 ("[T]he reason for that protection... 'ceas[es] to
operate.., where the desired advice refers... toffuture wrongdoing."' (quoting
8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2298, at 573)); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495,
1500 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[The attorney-client privilege] cannot be used to shield
ongoing or intended future criminal conduct."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87
F.3d at 381 ("The protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege does not
extend to any communication 'in furtherance of intended, or present, continuing
illegality."); In re Grand Jury No. 94-1, C.A. No. 95-50302, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2148, at *3 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1996) ("The District Court found ... that the
attorney 'was contacted with the specific purpose of assisting in further crime.'
This is precisely what the government was required to demonstrate."); United
States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he privilege does not apply
where legal representation was secured in furtherance of intended, or present,
continuing illegality."); In re John Doe, Inc., 13 F.3d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The
crime-fraud exception strips the privilege from attorney-client communications that
'relate to client communications in furtherance of contemplated or ongoing
criminal or fraudulent conduct."); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 162
(6th Cir. 1986) ("All reasons for the attorney-client privilege are completely
eviscerated when a client consults an attorney not for advice on past misconduct,
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concerning past, completed crimes or frauds are not subject to the
exception.5" Nevertheless, reliance on past crimes as a basis for asserting
but for legal assistance in carrying out a contemplated or ongoing crime or fraud.");
United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483,1494 (10th Cir. 1984) ("The attorney-client
privilege does not protect disclosure of plans for future illegal activity."); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The ultimate aim is
to promote the proper administration of justice. That end, however, would be
frustrated if the client used the lawyer's services to further a continuing or future
crime or tort."); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir.
1977) ("Because the attorney-client privilege is not to be used as a cloak for illegal
or fraudulent behavior, it is well established that the privilege does not apply where
legal representation was secured in furtherance of intended, or present, continuing
illegality."); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971)
("[T]he attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications between
attorney and client where the purpose of that communication is to further the crime
charged in the indictment or future intended illegality."); United States v. Hoffa,
349 F.2d 20, 37 (6th Cir. 1965) ("The attorney-client relationship would offer no
shield to either client or attorney if the client had been engaged in a plan to commit
a crime in the future."); In re Sawyer, 229 F.2d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1956) ("[A]
client's communication to his attorney in pursuit of a criminal or fraudulent act yet
to be performed is not privileged in any judicial proceeding."); United States v.
Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1939) ("It has always been settled that
communications from a client to an attorney about a crime or fraud to be
committed are not privileged.").
58 Thus, Professor Hazard has observed, "[I]t is common ground that the
privilege ought to apply at least to communications by an accused criminal to his
counsel, in contemplation of defense of a pending or imminently threatened
prosecution, concerning a completed crime." Hazard, supra note 1, at 1062
(footnotes omitted); see Zolin, 491 U.S. at 562 (stating that the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is "that clients be free 'to make full disclosure to their
attorneys' of past wrongdoings."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena 92-1(SJ), 31 F.3d
826, 831 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Attorney-client communications concerning past or
completed crimes do not come within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege."); In re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings 89-10 (MIA), 938 F.2d
1578, 1581 (1lth Cir. 1991) ("[T]he crime-fraud exception does not operate to
remove communications concerning past or completed crimes or frauds from the
attorney-client privilege."); United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 656-57 (3d Cir.
1991) ("Only disclosure of confidential information concerning past wrongdoing
is protected."); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("Communications with Doe and Roe regarding past crimes . . . remain
privileged."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983,731
F.2d at 1041 ("Advice sought in furtherance of a future or ongoing fraud is
unprivileged; communications with respect to advice as to past or completed frauds
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the privilege may prove unavailing since the failure to disclose even a past
crime may be a predicate for liability resulting from the cover-up of prior
wrongdoing. 9 This is an area in which corporate counsel, particularly, must
are within the privilege."); In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig.,
693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The privilege exists to encourage full
disclosure of pertinent information by clients to their attorneys. Its protection
extends to past criminal violations.") (citation omitted); In re Special Sept. 1978
Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 59 (7th Cir. 1980) ("It is settled that the attorney-client
privilege is waived when the client uses the attorney client relationship to engage
in on-going fraud rather than to defend against past misconduct."); In re Berkley
& Co., Inc., 629 F.2d at 553 ("Attorney-clientcommunications lose theirprivileged
character when the lawyer is consulted not with respect to past wrongdoings but
rather to further a continuing or contemplated criminal or-fraudulent scheme.");
Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d at 1355 ("[S]o important is full disclosure that the law
recognizes the privilege even if the advice is sought by one who has already
committed abad act."). This includes, as well, documents prepared by counsel after
the illegality ended, see Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 155 (D.
Del. 1977) ("If the documents were prepared subsequent to completion of the
alleged fraud, they could not be 'in furtherance' of the fraud."), and applies to
documents subject to the work product doctrine, see In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d
at 51 ("[T]he crime-fraud exception for work product immunity cannot apply if the
attorney prepared the material after his client's wrongdoing ended.").
59 Professor Gergacz has observed that "not revealing the past wrongdoing itself
may constitute a criminal or fraudulent act. Once the act has been communicated
to the attorney, an ongoing or newly created crime or fraud of the corporation not
reporting that activity may remove the communication from the privilege."
Gergacz, supra note 10, at 1679; see also J. Michael Callan & Harris David,
Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client
Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERs L. REv. 332, 348 (1976)
("Virtually every crime committed in the past carries with it some vestigial element
of continuing criminality."). For example, the Securities and Exchange
Commission suggested in its order accepting the settlement in the Salomon
Brothers case that the General Counsel's failure to disclose the unauthorized
trading in treasury notes could, in future cases, subject someone similarly situated
to liability for failure to supervise under 15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(4)(e) (1994). See In
re Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,067 (S.E.C.
Dec. 3, 1992); see also James R. Doty, Regulatory Expectations Regarding the
Conduct of Attorneys in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Law: Recent
Development [sic] and Lessons For the Future, 48 BUS. LAW. 1543, 1556-58
(1993). The SEC had previously sought to attribute liability to attorneys who failed
to disclose material inaccuracies in their clients' financial statements in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). See also SEC
v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1972) (reprinting Complaint of SEC). The
Office of Thrift Supervision also aggressively sought to assert liability of attorneys
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be sensitive."
Operation of the crime-fraud exception has the effect of transforming
the attorney into a witness against the client. This possibility directly
threatens the ability to frame a defense, especially if the attorney was
counsel to the defendant prior to or at the time of the alleged offense.6 For
who, in the view of the OTS, withheld material information concerning the
financial condition and business practices of their clients. See, e.g., In re Fishbein,
OTS AP-92-19 (1992) (LEXIS, Bankng Library, OTSDD File).
' Corporate counsel may provide advice, wholly innocently, which later results
in the commission of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. Counsel is bound by
applicable standards of legal ethics to maintain the confidentiality of client
confidences. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY Canon 4, DR4-
101(B)(1) (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.6, 1.13
(1998). However, as the Salomon Brothers, National Student Marketing, and
Fishbein cases suggest, the governmentwill view the failure to disclose misconduct
as evidence of counsel's complicity in the misconduct. Prosecutors have made it
clear that lawyers are not viewed any differently than other potential defendants in
a criminal investigation. See White Collar Crime Meeting Addresses Issues of
Privilege, supra note 12, at 1023; see generally H. Lowell Brown, The Dilemma
of Corporate Counsel Faced with Client Misconduct: Disclosure of Client
Confidences or Constructive Discharge, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 777, 824-63 (1996);
Richard W. Painter & JenniferE. Duggan, LawyerDisclosure ofCorporate Fraud:
Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L. REV. 225 (1996).
61 Seeking to compel an attorney to testify against a client, particularly where the
attorney represents the client in a criminal matter, implicates a criminal defendant's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The uncertainty and distrust between client and
attorney that would result from the attorney's revelation of client communications, as
well as the intimidation which the attorney would experience particularly because
appearance before a grand jury might result in charges being brought against the
attorney (i.e., perjury), may chill advocacy and cause ofa conflict of interests between
the attorney and client. See United States v. Edgar, 82 F.3d 499, 507-08 (1st Cir.
1996); Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Ct for the Dist of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1354
(1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1983). As one
court observed in this regard:
There may be an implicit threat to the attorney called to testify about a
client to the grand jury that the attorney will become a target himself should
the prosecutor think he knowingly participated in the fraud. This is
particularly so where the prosecution asserts that the privilege must give way
to the crime-fraud exception. The lawyer may be tempted to reveal privileged
conversations in order to avoid becoming a target himself. Ideally, counsel
receiving a subpoena will give notice to a client and consistently assert the
privilege on behalf of a client. Ideally, a prosecutor faced with an assertion of
privilege by an attorney witness will seek ajudicial determination of whether
the privilege is valid. But we do not live in an ideal world.
Edgar, 82 F.3d at 508 (footnotes omitted). The court in Whitehouse noted that service
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corporate counsel, the possibility that counsel might later become a witness
against the corporation, or against the employee who consulted with
counsel on the corporation's behalf, should be expected to chill the
willingness of many employees to seek out counsel in the first instance.
The confrontation of the need for (and desirability of) confidentiality
between attorneys and their clients 6 2 with the judiciary's right, particularly
that of the grand jury, "to every man's evidence 63 creates tension in our
of a grand jury subpoena on a lawyer may: 1) chill the relationship between
lawyer and client 2) create an immediate conflict of interest for the
attorney/witness; 3) divert the attorney's time and resources away from his
client; 4) discourage attorneys from providing representation in controversial
criminal cases; and 5) force attorneys to withdraw as counsel because of
ethical rules prohibiting an attorney from testifying against his client.
Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1354. These adverse affects on the attorney-client relationship
have been noted by commentators as well. See Stacy Caplow, Commentary-The
Reluctant Witness for the Prosecution: Grand Jury Subpoenas to Defense Counsel,
51 BROOK. L. REv. 769, 784-86 (1985); Ronald Goldstock & Steven Chananie,
"Criminal"Lawyers: The Use ofElectronic Surveillance and Search Warrants in the
Investigation and Prosecution ofAttorneys Suspected of Criminal Wrongdoing, 136
U. PENN. L. REV. 1855, 1865 (1988); Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 5, at 833-35;
Stem & Hoffnan, supra note 12, at 1789-93.
In response, the United States Department of Justice has adopted procedures
governing the issuance of subpoenas directed to attorneys. The procedures require,
inter alia, the prior approval of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
criminal division, who must be satisfied that there are "reasonable grounds to believe
that a crime has been or is being committed and that the information sought is
reasonably needed for the successful completion of the investigation or prosecution."
2 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY's MANUAL § 9-13.410(c) (1997). In addition, "[t]he
need for the information must outweigh the potential adverse effects upon the
attorney-client relationship." Id.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") has also promulgated two resolutions
addressing subpoenas directed to attorneys. These resolutions, adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates in February 1986 and February 1988, urge state and federal
authorities to adopt rules requiring prior judicial approval of attorney-oriented
subpoenas based on a finding, inter alia, that the information sought is not protected
by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. These resolutions are
appended to Stern & Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1852-54. Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia have adopted variations of the
ABA's proposed rules. See Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1353 n. 4.62 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text
63 The Supreme Court has noted:
'For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental
maxim that the public... has a right to every man's evidence. When we
come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary
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jurisprudence." As a consequence, once the party asserting the privilege
has established entitlement to the privilege's protections," the party
seeking to pierce those protections then has the burden of establishing that
the crime-fraud exception applies.'
assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is
capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly
exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule."
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,331 (1950) (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note
3, § 2192, at 64); accord Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996); United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688
(1972); seeIn re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) ("The privilege
itself is an exception to the critically important duty of citizens to disclose relevant
evidence in legal proceedings.").
" For this reason, it has been said that "[t]he attorney-client privilege is cast in
perpetual tension." Dyer, 722 F.2d at 177; accord In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805
F.2d 155, 164 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Often... [the attorney-client and work product]
privileges come into conflict with other societal interests when they are invoked
during a grand jury investigation."); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum,
773 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1985) ("When a claim of privilege is asserted in the
context of resisting compliance with a grand jury subpoena, strong competing
principles are at odds."); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35,723 F.2d 447,
451 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Since the attorney-clientprivilege may serve as a mechanism
to frustrate the investigative or fact-finding process, it creates an inherent tension
with society's need for full and complete disclosure of all relevant evidence during
implementation of the judicial process."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d
666,671-72 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]he purpose of the privilege-to suppress truth-runs
counter to the dominant aims of the law.").
65 The party seeking the benefits of the attorney-client privilege bears the
burden of establishing entitlement to the privilege. See Motley v. Marathon Oil
Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1550 (10th Cir. 1995); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974
F.2d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d
1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1167
(5th Cir. 1985); In re GrandJury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d at 450-5 1;
In re Grand Jury Proceedings in the Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (1 lth
Cir. 1983); United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d928, 938 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Stem, 511 F.2d 1364, 1367 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d
248, 252 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir.
1973).
66 See In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v.
Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d
377,381 (9th Cir. 1996); In re RichardRoe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38,40 (2d Cir. 1995); In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
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This requires a two-part showing. First, it must be shown that the
underlying crime or fraud was committed. Second, it must be shown that
the otherwise privileged communication was in furtherance of the client's
crime or fraud.67
1. Proof of the Underlying Crime or Fraud
As an initial matter, the proponent of the crime-fraud exception
generally must demonstrate that a crime or fraud was committed which was
"sufficiently serious to defeat the privilege."68 The proponent is not
required to prove the crime or fraud definitively. Instead, all that is required
is a prima facie showing.69 There must be evidence which, if believed, is
sufficient to establish the elements of a crime or fraud." At one time, it was
thought that the crime or fraud underlying the exception had to be the same
Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 540 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399
(D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983,
731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557, 562
(8th Cir. 1984); In re Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983); Dyer, 722
F.2d at 178; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982);
Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1972).
67 See In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d at 49; In re RichardRoe, Inc., 68 F.3d at 40;
Cox v. Administrator United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1416 (11th
Cir.), modified on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994); In re Federal
Grand Jury Proceedings 89-10 (MIA), 938 F.2d 1578, 1581 (11th Cir. 1991); In re
Grand Jury (G.J. No. 87-03-A), 845 F.2d 896, 897 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d at 1226-27; In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at
164; In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d at 399; In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 814-15
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
68In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d at 399.
69See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); Haines v. Liggett Group,
Inc. 975 F.2d 81, 95 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d at 399; In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d at 1039; In re
International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir.
1982); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 814; United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40
(2d Cir. 1939). The prima facie case is discussed infra Part Il.A.
70 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d at 1226; In re Sealed Case, 754
F.2d at 399; In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 815; see also Haines, 975 F.2d at 95-96
("[T]he party seeking discovery must present evidence which, if believed by the
fact-finder, would be sufficient to support a finding that the elements of the crime-
fraud exception were met.").
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as the crime or fraud under investigation,7' but such a rule has not been
accepted. 2 Nor must the fraud involved be criminal in order to invoke the
exception.73 Indeed, the crime or fraud need not have been successfully
completed to warrant the exception so long as there was a criminal or
fraudulent objective at the time of the attorney-client communication. 4
Nevertheless, in order to establish the predicate crime or fraud, more
must be shown than mere allegations of misconduct or simply the fact that
a party to the communication is a target of a grand jury investigation.75 The
failure to make the requisite showing of the underlying crime or fraud is
fatal to the assertion of the crime-fraud exception. 6
" It was suggested by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. United States, 138
U.S. 353 (1891), that "the rule announced in [Regina v. Cox] should be limited to
cases where the party is tried for the crime in furtherance of which the
communication was made." Id. at 359-60; accord Kaufman v. United States, 212
F. 613, 618 (2d Cir. 1914).
' See, e.g., In re Berkley & Co., Inc. 629 F.2d 548, 555 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Our
research has disclosed no decision subsequent to Alexander directly supporting its
rule."); see also James A. Gardner, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-
ClientPrivilege, 47 A.B.A. J. 708,709-10 (1961); John J. Dutton, Note, Evidence:
Attorney-Client Privilege: Communications in Furtherance ofa Crime, 45 CAL. L.
REv. 75 (1957).
73 See In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15,1983,731 F.2d
at 1039.
74 See id.
' Mere allegations of wrongdoing, see In re International Sys. & Controls
Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bob, 106
F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1939), or "a strong suspicion" of misconduct, see In re Anti-
trust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 165 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
in the Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981), are not sufficient to
establish the predicate for the crime-fraud exception. In like fashion, an indictment
is not sufficient evidence of a crime or fraud to overcome the privilege. See In re
Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d
174, 178 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Callan & David, supra note 59, at 346 ("As to
what constitutes a prima facie case, a mere allegation that the client has engaged
in criminal or fraudulent conduct is insufficient by itself to defeat the client's claim
of privilege."); Gardner, supra note 72, at 710 ("[S]ome early cases indicated that
a mere charge of fraud was sufficient to bring the rule into operation. But it is now
clear that more than this is required.") (footnote omitted).
7 See, e.g., Industrial Clearinghouse, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Div., 953 F.2d
1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1992); Charles Woods Television Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC
Inc., 869 F.2d 1155, 1161-62 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v.
Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277, 283 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600
F.2d 215, 219 (9th Cir. 1979); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d
1215, 1220-21 (4th Cir. 1976); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D.
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Further, when the crime-fraud exception is asserted against a corpora-
tion, the proponent must establish that the crime or fraud was committed
by the corporation and not simply by a corporate employee on a frolic.7
Aside from the vexing questions of corporate vicarious liability this
raises," there is the question whether the communication with counsel,
either on the behalf of a corporation or an individual, was in furtherance of
a crime or fraud. It is this issue that is addressed in the second prong of the
analysis.
2. The Attorney-Client Communication Was in
Furtherance of the Client's Crime or Fraud
It would seem that a communication between an attorney and client "in
furtherance" of a crime or fraud is a communication which in some way
21, 30-31 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
' Seeln re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46,50 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[F]rom the material
before the district court, there was no way of knowing or even guessing whether
the vice president was on a frolic of his own, against the advice of Company
counsel, when he [committed the crime].").
7 As noted, a corporation must act and communicate with its attorneys through
its employees. Although under Upjohn Co. v. United States, 425 U.S. 383 (1981),
the attorney-client privilege extends to communications with counsel by employees
at all levels of the corporation, ordinarily only officers and directors are authorized
to waive the attorney-client privilege so long as they are acting consistently "with
their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation and not of
themselves as individuals." CommodityFutures Trading Comm. v. Weintraub, 471
U.S. 343, 348-49 (1985). Likewise, as also noted, the actions of even low-level
employees may subject the corporation to liability so long as there was some
intention to benefit the corporation. Seesupra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
Thus, as the court in In re Sealed Case suggests, in determining the applicability
of the crime-fraud exception in the corporate context, it is essential that the focus
of the inquiry be on the intent of the employee to further the criminal objectives of
the corporation (not the individual employee), rather than rely on a wooden
application of quasi-agency principles of corporate vicarious liability. See In re
Sealed Case, 107 F.2d at 50-5 1. The court noted:
The government suggested at oral argument that even if [the corporate
officer was on a frolic of his own], the Company could still be held
criminally liable. There are circumstances under which corporations are
responsible for the crimes of their agents. But neither in this court nor in the
district court did the government offer anything in terms of evidence or law
to support the idea that the Company bore criminal responsibility for the
acts of this officer. The government therefore did not sustain its burden.
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advances the commission of an illegal act. One court recently held,
however, that an otherwise privileged communication can be "in
furtherance" of prohibited activity "even if the attorney does nothing after
the communication to assist the client's commission of a crime, and even
though the communication turns out not to help (and perhaps even to
hinder) the client's completion of a crime.' 79 The court based this
conclusion primarily on the grounds that the attorney's knowledge of the
criminal plan is wholly irrelevant to whether the crime-fraud exception
applies. Rather, it is the client's intent in consulting with counsel that is
determinative. 80
79 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 382 (9th Cir. 1996). In this case,
a corporation, its president, and two employees were targets of a grand jury
investigation into possible tax evasion and violation of the immigration laws arising
from the company's employment of a woman whom it knew did not have the
required visa and working permits. See id. at 379. Subpoenas were served on two
former corporate counsel seeking their testimony regarding communications with
their client concerning the employment status and form of compensation of the
woman in connection with the attorneys' preparation and filing of documents with
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See id. at 379-80. The court
summarized the evidence submitted to the district court with regard to the crime-
fraud exception as follows:
The evidence shows that the corporate targets consulted counsel about Mrs.
T's employment status shortly after another employee told [the
corporation's president] of the likely illegality of the existing situation.
Corporation did not stop its alleged criminal conduct with regard to Mrs. T,
but continued to employ her illegally. When Corporation, through Roe,
corresponded with the INS in September and October of 1991 about its
petition to legalize Mrs. T's employment, it did not disclose that Mrs. T
already had been working in Corporation's U.S. Office illegally for more
than a year.
Id. at 382. On the basis of this evidence, the district court held that the government
had met its burden of showing that the communications with the corporation's
counsel was in furtherance of the corporation's illegal activity. See id. at 379-80.
" The court stated in this regard that "for the crime-fraud exception to apply,
'the attorney need not himself be aware of the illegality involved; it is enough that
the communication furthered, or was intended by the client to further, that
illegality.' "In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d at 381 (quoting United States
v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1981)). The corporation argued that the
government had failed to sustain its burden because
the government didn't show that there was any communication which was
in itself in furtherance of any crime (that is, there is no showing that either
lawyer made any false representation to the INS in connection with the
submission of Mrs. T's application); [attorneys] Roe and Doe were not
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While the clear weight of modem authority is to the effect that the
client's state of mind when consulting with counsel is the significant factor
in applying the crime-fraud exception, saying that an attorney's role in the
client's fraudulent or criminal transaction is irrelevant simply goes too far.
a. Intent of the Communication
The attorney-client privilege is said to "belong" to the client because
the privilege operates for the benefit ofthe client and not the attorney." For
aware of Mrs. T's employment arrangement and did not take an affirmative
step that in fact facilitated commission of the crimes; and as neither knew
about her status, the government failed to show that any communication
was in furtherance of a tax or immigration offense.
Id. at380-81. The courtrejected the corporation's argument andupheld the district
court's reliance on the client's intent. As the court stated, "[b]ecause all of
Corporation's points have to do with the attorney's knowledge, state of mind or
actions, we disagree that the district court erred since it focused, quite properly, on
the client." Id. at 381.
8 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d at 49 ("The privilege is the client's, and
it is the client's fraudulent or criminal intent that matters."); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 102 F.3d 748, 752 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[The attorney's knowledge of
the client's fraud does not control whether the crime-fraud exception vitiates the
attorney-client privilege."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d at 381-82
("Inasmuch as today's attorney-client privilege exists for the benefit of the client,
not the attorney, it is the client's knowledge and intentions that are of paramount
concern to the application of the crime-fraud exception.") (footnote omitted); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings Thursday Special Grand Jury Sept. Term, 1991, 33 F.3d
342, 348 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The client is the holder of the privilege."); Cox v.
Administrator United States Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1417 (11th Cir.)
("The attorney-client privilege 'belongs solely to the client.. .. ' ") (quoting In re
Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94,100-01 (2d Cir. 1987)), modified, 30 F.3d 1347 (1 th Cir.
1994); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979) ("It is clear
that the attorney-client privilege is one that is owned by the client. .. ."); Garner
v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1096 n.7 (5th Cir. 1970) ("The objection [on
grounds of the attorney-client privilege] is the client's to invoke, not the
attorney's."). Of course, although the privilege is for the benefit of the client, the
privilege can be invoked, and often is, by an attorney on behalf of the client. See,
e.g., In re Impounded Case (Law Firm), 879 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1989); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings in the Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571 (1 lth Cir. 1983); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 663 F.2d 1057, 1061 (5th Cir.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.
1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666, 668 (5th Cir. 1975); Hett v.
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that reason, it is generally the client's fraudulent or criminal intent in
communicating with an attorney that triggers the application of the crime-
fraud exception.82 There have been instances, however, where the criminal
intent of the attorney rather than the client served as the predicate for the
exception.1
3
United States, 353 F.2d 761,764 (9th Cir. 1965).
82 See, e.g., Jennison, supra note 38, at 937 ("The crime or fraud exception
focuses on intent. If the client's intent in seeking legal advice is legitimate the
claim of privilege should stand."). At least one commentator has suggested the
contrary, however. See Gergacz, supra note 10, at 1677 (suggesting that, at least
for the prima facie showing, the client's intent in seeking counsel is not
considered).
83As was stated in In re Impounded Case (Law Firm):
It is not apparent to us what interest is truly served by permitting an
attorney to prevent this type of investigation of his own alleged criminal
conduct by asserting an innocent client's privilege with respect to
documents tending to show criminal activity by the lawyer. On the contrary,
the values implicated, particularly the search for the truth, weigh heavily in
favor of denying the privilege in these circumstances.
In re Impounded Case (LawFirm), 879 F.2d at 1213-14; accord In re Sealed Case,
676 F.2d 793, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The prima facie violation may also be the
attorney's, since attorney misconduct negates the premise that the adversary system
furthers the cause of justice."); Moody v. Internal Revenue Serv., 654 F.2d 795,
800 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("An attorney should not be able to exploit the privilege for
ends outside of and antithetical to the adversary system any more than a client who
attempts to use the privilege to advance criminal or fraudulent ends."); see, e.g.,
United States v. Aucoin, 964 F.2d 1492, 1499 (5th Cir. 1992) (discussing counsel's
assistance to client in continuing to conduct illegal gambling operation); United
States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1086 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that attorney
participated with defendant in obstruction of grand jury's investigation); United
States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1167 (5th Cir. 1985) (determining that
defendant and attorney were coconspirators); United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d
557, 562 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that attorney assisted clients in shielding
transactions and hiding the source of funds); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518
F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting attorney's suggestion that witness leave the
country and that other witnesses give false testimony); United Sates v. Shewfelt,
455 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that attorney filed quiet title actions
knowing that clients had no interest in the real property); Hett, 353 F.2d at 764
(discussing attorneys aid to client in fleeing from prosecution); United States v.
Weinberg, 226 F.2d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1955) (noting that attorney was an
unindicted coconspirator with client in conspiracy to defraud the United States). A
similar rule applies with regard to attorney work product. See In reAntitrust Grand
Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 168 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Should the district court review the
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Thus, it is now almost uniformly recognized that the proponent of the
exception does not need to show that the attorney was a party to, or even
aware of, the client's illicit scheme. Instead, the attorney may be wholly
innocent of any wrongdoing, and still the client communications will be
subject to the exception so long as the client had formed the intent to
commit a crime or a fraud at the time the client sought the attorney's
counsel.1
4
This is not the end of the inquiry, however. Indeed, difficult issues
remain as to when the requisite intent must have been formed such that the
client's communication are outside the bounds ofthe privilege. The courts
have not been uniform in their resolution of these issues.
i. Prior to Consultation with Counsel
The clearest case for application of the crime-fraud exception is when
the client intends to commit (or is committing) a crime or fraud and seeks
the assistance of counsel, wittingly or not, to carry out the unlawful plan.
Indeed, these were the circumstances that gave rise to the exception in the
first instance and continue to be the most common circumstances under
which the crime-fraud exception is recognized.
8 5
documents and find that the law firms were knowing and willing conspirators in the
alleged crime, then all opinion work product made in furtherance of the alleged
crime should also be produced."); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1078 (4th Cir. 1981)
("No court construing this rule, however, has held that an attorney committing a
crime could, by invoking the work product doctrine, insulate himself from criminal
prosecution for abusing the system he is sworn to protect.").
84 See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1932) ("The attorney may be
innocent, and still the guilty client must let the truth come out."); see also In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 102 F.3d at 752; United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495,
1504 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d at 381-82; United
States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Laurins, 857
F.2d 529,540 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury (G.J. No. 87-03-A), 845 F.2d 896,
898 (1 1th Cir. 1988); United States v. Soudan, 812 F.2d 920, 927 (5th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287,292 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Sealed Case, 754
F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984); Horvath, 731 F.2d at 762; In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (1lth Cir. 1982); In re Sealed
Case, 676 F.2d at 812; United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971).
Thus it has been observed:
The attorney-client privilege has always been subject to the qualification
1998-991
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ii. After Consultation with Counsel
But what of the client who consults with counsel, in good faith, for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice but later forms the intent to commit a
crime or fraud after obtaining counsel's advice? Should the crime-fraud
exception operate post hoc to lift the veil of privilege from the earlier
communication? In one case, Judge J. Shelly Wright appeared to suggest
that the crime-fraud exception would apply where it was shown that "the
client actually committed or attempted a crime or fraud subsequent to
receiving the benefit of counsel's workproduct."86 Judge Wright's view has
not gained acceptance, however. 7 Instead, it is the client's intent at the
time of the communication that is considered determinative of whether the
crime-fraud exception will apply.8 It is also clear that the mere showing
that protection is denied to communications wherein a lawyer's assistance
is sought in activity that the client knows to constitute a crime or tort. The
knowledge requirement minimizes the effect of the exception on proper
communications; absent this requirement legitimate consultations would be
inhibited by the risk that their subject matter might turn out to be illegal and
therefore unprivileged.
Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to Communications Privileges, 77
HARV. L. REV. 730, 730-31 (1964).
86 In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 815. Judge Wright's opinion in this regard was
his own, however, since neither Judge Tamm, who concurred in the result only, nor
Judge Wald joined in that part of Judge Wright's opinion. Moreover, Judge
Wright's comments regarding the timing of the client's conduct can be read fairly
as addressing the first prong of the two-part inquiry, that is, the "showing of a
violation sufficiently serious to defeat the... privilege." Id. at 814. Proponents of
the exception have relied on Judge Wright's opinion as authority for the argument
that the subsequent use of an attorney's advice or work product to perpetrate a
fraud is a sufficient predicate for invoking the crime-fraud exception even when it
has not been shown that the client had intended to commit the crime or fraud at the
time of the communication with counsel. See Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp. v.
Jaworski, 751 F.2d 277, 283 n.5 (8th Cir. 1984) (criticizing Judge Wright's
opinion).
87 One commentator has suggested that such post hoc reasoning is analogous to
asserting that "the cock's crowing made the sun rise." Fried, supra note 13, at 482.
88 Indeed, the two decisions cited by Judge Wright are to this effect. In In re
GrandJury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979), the issue was whether the
law firm which provided the sought-after documents had been retained before or
after the crime was committed. The court explained:
If the crime had been completed before retention of the Cleary firm, then
the privilege should be in effect. If, however, the crime was a continuing
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that a client committed a crime or fraud after having consulted with an
attorney is not sufficient to invoke the crime-fraud exception unless it is
also shown that the client intended to commit the crime or fraud at the time
of the consultation with counsel.8 9 In this connection, it is recognized that
a client may commit a crime or fraud in spite of the advice of counsel and
accordingly, so long as it is not shown that the advice was sought in
furtherance of the unlawful plan, the privilege remains intact.9" Indeed, to
one, or one that occurred after the firm was consulted, then the prima facie
showing made by the government would suffice to allow inspection by the
grand jury.
Id. at 803. In the second case, In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977), the
government apparently showed that the law frm's clients were in the process of
committing fraud on the Patent Office at the time legal advice was sought. The
court noted that the government was required to show that "the client was engaged
in or planning a criminal or fraudulent scheme when he sought the advice of
counsel to further the scheme.. . ." Id. at 338. The court concluded that the
government had not made the requisite showing. See id.
8'For example, in the recent decision of In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), the D.C. Circuit appears to have rejected Judge Wright's view.
The critical consideration is that the government's presentation had to
be aimed at the intent and action of the client. It was not enough for the
government to show that the vice president committed a crime after he
wrote his memorandum and attended the late August meeting with
Company counsel .... Unless the government made some showing that the
Company intended to further and did commit a crime, the government could
not invoke the crime-fraud exception to the privilege.
Id. at 50; accord In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 798 F.2d 32, 34 (2d
Cir. 1986) ("The crime/fraud exception.., cannot be successfully invoked merely
upon a showing that the client communicated with counsel while.., engaged in
criminal activity [but] only when there is probable cause to believe that the
communications ... were intended in some way to facilitate or to conceal the
criminal activity."); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d at 402 ("Although we agree that
'mere coincidence in time,' without more, cannot support the invocation of the
exception, the evidence presented to the district court clearly demonstrates more
than just simple coincidence."); Pritchard-KeangNam Corp., 751 F.2d at 283 n.5
("That the fraud merely follows the attorney-client communication does not alone
support discovery.").
" The court in Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992),
observed:
Where the client commits a fraud or crime for reasons completely
independent of legitimate advice communicated by the lawyer, the seal [of
secrecy] is not broken, for the advice is, as the logicians explain, non causa
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do otherwise would allow an adverse inference to be drawn from legiti-
mately seeking legal advice.9'
pro causa. The communication condemned and unprotected by the
attorney-client privilege is advice that is illicit because it gives direction for
the commission of future fraud or crime. The advice must relate to future
illicit conduct by the client; it is the causapro causa, the advice that leads
to the deed.
Id. at 90. In like fashion, the court in In re Burlington Northern, Inc., 822 F.2d 518
(5th Cir. 1987), held that it was error for the district court to have failed to inquire
whether the specific litigation activities were illegitimate, notwithstanding evidence
that the defendants had utilized lawsuits to accomplish their anti-competitive goals.
The court explained:
The attorney/client privilege and work product immunity protect
communications and papers generated when a client engages his attorney
for legitimate purposes. To the extent the railroads sought out their
attorneys to bring lawful suits and consulted with them in connection with
such suits, they were within the scope of this protection. That the railroads
might also have consulted and received the help of their attorneys in
connection with other activities that are not lawful does not change this
conclusion. The focus must be narrowed to the specific purpose of the
particular communication or document. To the extent the document deals
with a protected activity, it is immune from discovery.
Id. at 525; accord In re Grand Jury in the Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d 199, 204 (5th
Cir. 198 1) ("The professional relationship between Fine and his client either was
formed to further a criminal enterprise or it was legitimate and independent. Mr.
Fine has testified that it was legitimate and independent, and the government has
failed to make a contrary prima facie showing.").
The court's suggestion in In re Grand Jury Proceedings that an attorney-client
communication could be in furtherance of a crime or fraud "even though the
communication turns out not to help (and perhaps even to hinder) the client's
completion of a crime" ignores this critical inquiry of whether the specific advice
sought was legitimate or not. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 382 (9th
Cir. 1996). Absent a showing that the communication with counsel was in
furtherance of an unlawful end, the better view is that the attorney-client privilege
remains intact.
9 As the court in In re Sealed Case observed:
Companies operating in today's complex legal and regulatory environments
routinely seek legal advice about how to handle all sorts of matters, ranging
from their political activities to their employment practices to transactions
that may have antitrust consequences. There is nothing necessarily
suspicious about the officers of this corporation getting such advice. True
enough, within weeks of the meeting about campaign finance law, the vice
president violated that law. But the government had to demonstrate that the
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b. Relationship Between the Communication
and the Underlying Crime or Fraud
In addition to showing that the client intended to further the crime or
fraud by consulting with the attorney, there must be a relationship between
the communication or the attorney's advice and the underlying crime or
fraud. The required relatedness is not synonymous with "relevance," and
the courts have not hesitated to reject crime-fraud arguments by either the
government or private litigants grounded solely on the contention that the
Company sought the legal advice with the intent to further its illegal
conduct. Showing temporal proximity is not enough.
In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d at 50. The court in United States v. White, 887 F.2d
267 (D.C. Cir. 1989), agreed, saying:
Far from showing that [the attorney's] advice was intended to further a
crime or fraud, the evidence suggests ... that [the attorney's] advice was
intended to prevent unlawful conduct. [The client's] failure to heed his
lawyer's counsel does not alter this critical facet of the case.
The district court's ruling... would deny [the client] the privilege
where even its stem critics acknowledge that the justifications for the shield
are the strongest-where a client seeks counsel's advice to determine the
legality of conduct before the client takes any action.
Id. at 271-72 (footnote omitted); accordIn re International Sys. & Controls Corp.
Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982).
[I]t may well be that the purpose in commencing the special review was
entirely pure. In the modem corporate world with multiple subsidiaries and
hundreds of employees, shady practices may occur without the directors'
and officers' knowledge. An attempt by management to investigate past and
present questionable practices should not be discouraged by guaranteed
disclosure.
Id. at 1243 (footnote omitted). One commentator, however, has suggested that "the
subsequent appropriation to an illegal end of legal services originally obtained for
a proper purpose" would "lie within the future crime or tort exception." Note,
supra note 85, at 731. Fairly read, the commentator appears to be referring to
situations in which the client contemplates future unlawful action at the time of the
consultation with counsel.
Although there might be some loss of frankness in the original
communication due to the client's fear that his later application of the
attorney's work to an illegal purpose will result in a loss of privilege, the
loss is likely to be marginal. And this inhibition, rooted in the




attorney-client communication or work product would be relevant to
establishing the underlying crime or fraud.92 There is, however, a substan-
tial divergence of views concerning the degree of relatedness which must
be shown to demonstrate that the attorney-client communication was in
furtherance of a crime or fraud.
Some courts, recognizing that the proponent of the crime-fraud
exceptionusually lacks specific information concerningthe communication
to which the privilege has been asserted,93 require only a minimal showing
92As was explained inIn re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1995):
The "relevant evidence" test departs from the correct "in furtherance"
test in two respects. First, the crime-fraud exception does not apply simply
because privileged communications would provide an adversary with
evidence of a crime or fraud. If it did, the privilege would be virtually
worthless because a client could not freely give, or an attorney request,
evidence that might support a finding of culpability. Instead, the exception
applies only when the court determines that the client communication or
attorney work product in question was itself in furtherance of the crime or
fraud.... Second, the crime-fraud exception applies only where there is
probable cause to believe that the particular communication with counsel
or attorney work product was intended in some way to facilitate or conceal
the criminal activity.... Because a simple finding of relevance does not
demonstrate a criminal or fraudulent purpose, it does not trigger the
exception.
Id. at 40-41 (citations omitted); accord Pritchard-Keang Nam Corp., 751 F.2d at
283 ("That the report may help prove that a fraud occurred does not mean that it
was used in perpetrating the fraud.").
9 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1227 (1lth Cir.
1987) ("[T]he determination whether the requested material is sufficiently related
to the investigation must take into account that the government does not know
precisely what the material will reveal or how useful it will be."); In re Sealed
Case, 676 F.2d 793, 814 n.83 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Even in its present posture, the
government is hampered by having no idea what type of information is contained
in seven of the eight items that the District Court ordered Company to produce.").
Nevertheless, as the court in Cox v. Administrator United States Steel & Carnegie,
17 F.3d 1386, modified, 30 F.3d 1347 (1 lth Cir. 1994), cautioned:
Although that determination [of communications that should not be
privileged because they were used to further a crime or fraud] "must take
into account that the [party seeking discovery] does not know precisely
what the material will reveal or how useful it will be," "there is no reason
to permit opponents of the privilege to engage in groundless fishing
expeditions."
Id. at 1416 (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d at 1227; United
States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 571 (1989)).
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of relatedness.94 One court emphasized that this standard is not to be
"interpreted restrictively." 95 Other courts have imposed a somewhat higher
standard that the communication or work product be "reasonably related"
to the crime or fraud.96 Still other courts have required a showing of a close
relationship between the privileged material and the client's crime or
fraud.97 Regardless of the standard applied, it has been said that the purpose
of the requirement of relatedness is "easy differentiation between material
for which the law should not furnish the protections of a privilege and
material for which a privilege should be respected."'
While relatedness may be a useful requirement in winnowing out
baseless assertions of the crime-fraud exception, it is not the complete
answer. That is, a showing of relatedness, even under the most stringent
standard, is not sufficient to establish that the communication was in
94 Thus, for example, some courts require only a "potential relationship...
between the documents and the charges under investigation," In re September 1975
Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734, 738 (10th Cir. 1976), or "some relationship
between the communication at issue and theprimafacie violation," In re Antitrust
Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 164 (6th Cir. 1986), or "that the communication is
related to the criminal or fraudulent activity," In re Grand Jury (G.J. No. 87-03-A),
845 F.2d 896, 898 (1 1th Cir. 1988). See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842
F.2d at 1227; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 n.6 (3d Cir. 1979).
951 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d at 1227 ("[T]he requirement that
legal advice must be related to the client's criminal or fraudulent conduct should
not be interpreted restrictively.").
96 See In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d at 1243
("[T]he work product must reasonably relate to the fraudulent activity."); In re
Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 814-15 ("[T]he court must find some valid relationship
between the work product under subpoena and the primafacie violation.... A
finding that the work product reasonably relates to the subject matter of the
possible violation should suffice.").
9' See, e.g., Cox, 17 F.3d at 1417; Charles Wood Television Corp. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 869 F.2d 1155, 1161-62 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard-KeangNam
Corp., 751 F.2d at 283; In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 338 (8th Cir. 1977).
98 In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 815 n.91. It has also been observed that
questions of relatedness should be resolved in favor of upholding the privilege:
Concern for professional relationships dictates that all doubtful questions be
resolved in favor of privilege, even when the statement lacks close relationship
to either the proper or improper end. Hence, the exception.., should admit
only communications which are in furtherance of the illegal purpose. In
situations involving merely a statement of intention to commit a crime, that
statement alone should be admissible.
Note, supra note 85, at 733.
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furtherance of a crime or fraud.99 Instead, there must be evidence that the
attorney-client relationship was usedin furtherance of the crime or fraud."'
c. An Affirmative Act That Either
Promotes or Conceals the Crime or Fraud
In order to meaningfully discern between an attorney-client communi-
cation that is either merely related to or contemporaneous with a client's
crime or fraud (and therefore is subject to the attorney-client privilege) and
a communication that is in furtherance of a crime or fraud (and therefore
is subject to the exception), there must be a showing that the consultation
with the attorney resulted in some act, either by the client or by the
attorney, that was in aid of the crime or fraud.'0' That is, there must be
some evidence that the attorney-client relationship was actually abused by
the client in furtherance of the unlawful scheme.
Such a showing can be made through direct evidence that there were
attorney-client communications that were incident to the client's unlawful
conduct. For example, where the attorney and the client engage in the
illegality together,"°2 or where the client discloses the unlawful plan to the
99 As Justice Ginsburg (then a judge on the D.C. Circuit) explained in United
States v. White, 887 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1989):
The crime-fraud exception has a precise focus: It applies only when the
communications between the client and his lawyer further a crime, fraud or
other misconduct. It does not suffice that the communications may be
related to a crime. To subject the attorney-client communications to
disclosure, they must actually have been made with an intent to further an
unlawful act.
Id. at 271.
1" It has been observed that "[t]he primary difficulty with [relatedness] tests is
that they operate to deprive the client of the protections of the privilege in
circumstances where the consultation was in all respects legitimate and proper."
Callan & David, supra note 59, at 347. Direct evidence that the attorney-client
relationship was abused cures this deficiency.
101 See In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he crime-
fraud exception applies only where there is probable cause to believe that the
particular communication with counsel or attorney work product was intended in
some way to facilitate or to conceal the criminal activity."); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (1 lth Cir. 1987) ("[T]here must be a showing
that the attorney's assistance was obtained in furtherance of the criminal or
fraudulent activity or was closely related to it.").
02 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Thursday Special Grand Jury Sept.
Term, 1991, 33 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that attorneys were involved
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attorney, 3 the communications between the client and the attorney would
not be privileged.
A showing that the attorney-client relationship was abused would also
be made where there was an affirmative act on the part of the attorney
which promoted the client's crime or fraud. Thus, where the attorney
performed legal services such as forming corporations,' 14 obtaining
in setting sham minority contracting firms to comply with minority set-aside
program); United States v. Aucoin, 964 F.2d 1492, 1495 (5th Cir. 1992) (assisting
client in obtaining seized records necessary to conduct gambling operations);
United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1086 (8th Cir.), on rehearing, 856 F.2d
1189 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding that both defendant and attorney conspired to
obstruct the grand jury's investigation by suborning perjury); United States v.
Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1167 (5th Cir. 1985) (refusingto apply privilege where
attorney and client conspired to murder a federal judge); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073,
1073 (4th Cir. 1981) (disallowing privilege where attorney conspired to obstruct
justice and suborn perjury); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 974
(5th Cir. 1975) (invoking crime-fraud exception where attorney recommended that
one witness leave the country and other witnesses give perjured testimony); United
States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1972) (disallowing privilege where
attorney filed quiet title actions in aid of client's fraud knowing that client had no
interest in the property); Hett v. United States, 353 F.2d 761,764 (9th Cir. 1966)
(invoking exception where attorney aided client in flight from prosecution); United
States v. De Vasto, 52 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1931) (invoking exception where
attorney took title to illicit brewery and sold half interest for client's benefit).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1494 (10th Cir. 1984)
(disallowing privilege where client told attorney aboiut plan to destroy records so
that the government would not get them); In re Doe, 551 F.2d 899, 900 (2d Cir.
1977) (disallowing privilege where client told attorney about plan to bribe ajuror);
United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 909 (8th Cir. 1975) (invoking crime-fraud
exception where defendant discussed plan to defraud insurance company); In re
Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805,807-08 (7th Cir. 1956) (invoking exception where
client told attorney that he would perjure himself in exchange for dismissal of
criminal charges); United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1939)
(invoking exception where client discussed control of mining venture used in
fraudulent scheme); Fuston v. United States, 22 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir. 1927)
(refusing to apply privilege where client signed documents in attorney's presence
using false name).
"3o See, e.g., United States v. Billingsley, 440 F.2d 823, 824 (7th Cir. 1971)
(invoking crime-fraud exception where attorney's incorporation of trusts and
mailing of corporate documents to client were acts in furtherance of conspiracy to
defraud);United Statesv. Weinberg, 226 F.2d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1955) (disallowing
assertion of privilege where attorney assisted in incorporating trade schools and
negotiating financing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud the Veteran's
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licenses, 0 5 assisting in the purchase or sale of assets, 06 or providing other
services on behalf of a client 7 that assisted the client in accomplishing the
Administration).
05 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena 92-1(SJ), 31 F.3d 826, 828 (9th Cir.
1994) (invoking crime-fraud exception where corporate counsel obtained export
license that allowed company illicitly to ship global positioning systems to Iran
through the United Arab Emirates); Duttle v. Bandler & Kass, 127 F.R.D. 46, 54
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (invoking exception where communications with counsel
concerning the acquisition of licenses to continue trading securities were in
furtherance of fraud).
'06 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d at 1227 (disallowing
assertion of privilege where assistance in generating and disposing of unreported
income was in furtherance of client's evasion of taxes); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1038-39 (2d Cir. 1984)
(invoking exception to privilege where legal assistance in sale of subsidiary was in
furtherance of fraud against the United States); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727
F.2d 1352, 1353-54 (4th Cir. 1984) (invoking exception where attorney assisted in
fraudulent private placement of limited partnership interests); Pollock v. United
States, 202 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1953) (disallowing claim of privilege where
attorney received large cash deposits from client and used proceeds to purchase real
estate in furtherance of client's evasion of income tax).
107 See, e.g., United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1996)
(denying privilege where attorneys' false disclosure to the customs service
concerning the cost of imported goods was in furtherance of client's tax fraud);
United States v. Edgar, 82 F.3d 499, 502 (1st Cir. 1996) (invoking crime-fraud
exception where attorney filed fraudulent insurance claim for lost wages supported
by false tax returns provided by client); United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 657
(3d Cir. 1991) (invoking exception where attorney conducted negotiations which
constituted attempted extortion); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 539, 541
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding privilege inapplicable where attorney's services were
utilized in furtherance of client's conspiracy); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d
1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 1971) (applying crime-fraud exception where attorney
obtained illicit copies of grand jury transcripts at client's direction); Union Camp
Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144-45 (4th Cir. 1967) (disallowing privilege where
attorney's advice served client's violation of anti-trust laws); Avramides v. First
Nat'l Bank of Md., No. 87 Civ. 5732, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1647 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
19, 1997) (invoking exception where attorney filed collusive law suit); Greenwood
v. State, No. 84 Civ. 9143, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11954 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
1992) (applying exception where attorney for state employer brought disciplinary
action against a state psychiatrist in bad faith); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Cafritz, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11152 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 1991) (disallowing
privilege where attorneys prepared marital trust used to defraud creditors); Duttle,
127 F.R.D. at 54 (disallowing privilege where communications with counsel
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unlawful objective, the communications associated with the performance
of those services would not be privileged.
In like fashion, attorney-client communications that result in the
attorney's assistance in concealing the client's crime or fraud would not
be privileged. Thus, abuse of the attorney-client relation would be
shown where the provision of legal services prevented detection of a
conspiracy,1 8 where misleading reports were made to the government
to hide misconduct,"° where the attorney conducted transactions on
behalf of the client to conceal assets or sources of funds,110 where
transactions were mischaracterized to conceal their true nature,"' where
information was withheld from investigators by the attorney,"2 or where
concerning operation of sales force since sales personnel were instrumentalities of
fraud).
,08 For example, agreements to pay legal fees of conspirators are considered in
furtherance of concealment of the conspiracy. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (1 lth Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
680 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d
1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 640 F. Supp. 1047,
1049-50 (S.D.W. Va. 1986).
109 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 813-16 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(disallowing privilege where report to the SEC regarding "questionable payments"
did not fully disclose that company officers had lied to the IRS); In re John Doe
Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1982) (denying claim of privilege where
report of internal investigation was used to conceal corrupt payment to public
official); In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (1), 640 F.2d 49, 60 (7th Cir. 1980)
(denying privilege where report did not disclose a state political fund maintained
by trade association in furtherance of an ongoing fraud).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1986)
(invoking crime-fraud exception where bankruptcy petition did not disclose
fraudulent transfer of property); United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557, 562 (8th
Cir. 1984) (disallowing privilege where attorney conducted transactions to shield
clients' business transactions and to hide the source of funds); United States v.
Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (denying privilege where attorney
assisted in investment ofracketeering income), aff'd, 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987).
"' See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 102 F.3d 748, 752 (4th Cir. 1996)
(denying privilege where bank's attorneys furthered bank's fraud by mis-
characterizing the recipients of loans and thereby concealing their true beneficiary);
United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1983) (invoking crime-fraud
exception where attorney's mischaracterization of the reason money was paid back
to an individual was part of client's attempt to cover up extortion).
11 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 382 (9th Cir. 1996)
(invoking crime-fraud exception where correspondence of corporation's attorneys
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The attorney-client privilege serves important societal interests. By
assuring the confidentiality of communications with counsel for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice, the privilege serves to encourage clients,
both individuals and corporations, to seek the advice of lawyers and
thereby comply with the obligations of law. The assurance of confidential-
ity also encourages candor between clients and attorneys which should
result in accurate legal counsel.
There are circumstances under which the confidentiality of attorney-
client communications can be abused. Rather than seeking advice for the
purpose of conforming conduct to the requirements of law, clients may
seek the advice of lawyers to help them violate the law. In some instances,
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding the legalization of an
alien's status did not disclose that the alien was already working for the
corporation); United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1993) (invoking
crime-fraud exception where client withheld document from attorney who
produced records pursuant to a grand jury subpoena); United States v. Laurins, 857
F.2d 529, 540 (9th Cir. 1988) (invoking exception where attorney falsely
represented that client did not have records responsible to a grand jury subpoena
because client had sequestered the records without informing the attorney); In re
Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (invoking exception where
attorneys were instrumentalities through which corporation carried out pervasive
scheme to alter or destroy subpoenaed evidence).
... See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 857 F.2d 710,712 (10th Cir. 1988)
(upholding use of exception where company committed crimes and used law firm
to cover up and perpetuate those crimes through a series of additional crimes and
frauds); United States v. Soudan, 812 F.2d 920, 927 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying
exception where attorney's assurance to witness that grand jury testimony would
be kept secret furthered defendant's scheme to cover up perjury before the grand
jury); In re Berldey & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 1980) (upholding use of
exception where attorney was involved in preparation of documents used by
defendants to avoid detection of various illegal and fraudulent schemes); Sound
Video Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1482, 1489 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (applying crime-fraud exception to communications about concealing illegal
wiretapping and wiretap transcripts); In re A.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2, 11 (D.
Kan. 1985) (finding exception applicable where counsel assisted company in
misrepresenting the safety and efficacy of the Dalkon Shield).
[VOL. 871242
THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION
the attorney-client relationship itself has been used to conceal the client's
criminal or fraudulent intentions and actions.
In these circumstances, an exception to the rule of attorney-client
confidentiality has been recognized. This "crime-fraud exception"' is
narrow and comes into play only when the attorney-client relation is abused
such that the benefits of client candor with a legal advisor are outweighed.
In recognition ofthe social importance of attorney-client confidential-
ity, the applicability of the crime-fraud exception requires a two-step
analysis. First, there must be evidence that a crime or fraud serious enough
to defeat the privilege was committed, or at least attempted, by the client.
To invoke the exception, it is not necessary for the crime or fraud to have
succeeded, but there must be sufficient evidence that the crime or fraud was
substantial and not hypothetical.
Once there has been a substantial showing that a crime or fraud was
committed, there must then be evidence that the client's otherwise
privileged communication with the attorney was actually in furtherance of
the client's crime or fraud. The client must have been engaged in planning
or carrying out the crime or fraud at the time of the communication with
counsel, and the client must have intended that the communication assist
in the perpetration of the crime or fraud. Additionally, the attorney must
have taken some demonstrable action, wittingly or not, in aid ofthe client's
crime or fraud.
The procedures under which these determinations are made have been
the subject of controversy and scholarly debate. There is uncertainty as to
the requisite quantum of evidence necessary to make the required
showings. Also, there is tension between, on the one hand, the concern for
judicial economy (i.e., the avoidance of mini-trials) coupled with the need
to preserve grand jury secrecy, and, on the other hand, the opportunity of
the privilege holder to be heard before confidential communications are
disclosed. As a result of this tension, courts have striven to find a middle
course of in camera inspection ofexparte submissions. These have proven
not to be wholly satisfactory and continue to raise issues of when such
procedures are appropriate and what evidence should be considered.
II. DETERMINING WHETHER THE CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION APPLIES
It is settled law that the crime-fraud exception requires a prima facie
showing that the consultation with counsel was in furtherance of a crime
or fraud committed or attempted by the client. In contrast, however,
questions of what constitutes this prima facie showing and how it is to be
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made are not so well settled and continue to occupy the attention of courts
and practitioners.
Out of well-founded concerns for judicial economy and the avoidance
of "mini-trials" of collateral issues, coupled with the need to maintain the
traditional guarantees of grand jury secrecy, district courts have exercised
their considerable discretion in fashioning procedures under which
evidence supporting the crime-fraud exception is considered in camera.
This is often done without giving the privilege holder any opportunity to
be informed of the allegations of abuse of the attorney-client relationship
or to offer evidence showing-that the relationship in fact was not abused.
In view of the significant social values that are served by the attorney-
client privilege, these largely exparte procedures are not wholly satisfac-
tory and will remain so until some accommodation is found for allowing
the interests of the privilege holder to be vindicated.
A. The Prima Facie Showing
1. The Quantum ofProofNecessary to Sustain the
Prima Facie Showing
In the seminal case of Clark v. United States,"4 Justice Cardozo,
writing for the Court, stated that while there were "early cases apparently
to the effect that a mere charge of illegality, not supported by any
evidence" would be sufficient to invoke the crime-fraud exception, "this
conception of the privilege is without support in later rulings."'" Instead,
"[t]o drive the privilege away, there must be 'something to give colour to
the charge;' there must be 'primafacie evidence that has some foundation
14 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932). The case involved ajudgment of
criminal contempt against a juror who had failed to disclose during voir dire that
she had personal and professional ties to the defendant's company. She also
discussed information obtained outside of trial and became the lone holdout for
acquittal during deliberations which she refused to join. A mistrial was declared
when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The government then sought a rule to
show cause why the juror should not be held in contempt for making false
statements during voir dire and for obstructing the trial. After holding a hearing,
the juror was held in criminal contempt. See id. at 7-9. On appeal and before the
Supreme Court, the juror challenged the admission of evidence concerning the
jury's deliberations, which she claimed were privileged. See id. at 12-13. The Court
analyzed the claim ofjury privilege by analogy to the attorney-client privilege and




in fact.' . . . When that evidence is supplied, the seal of secrecy is
broken."" 6
Justice Cardozo's formulation of the prima facie showing as evidence
giving "colour to the charge" of crime or fraud has been widely adopted."7
There has been little guidance or continuity, however, in the standards
applied by the courts in evaluating the substance of the prima facie
showing.1
8
Nonetheless, there is agreement that the prima facie showing is less
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 9 Some courts have adopted the
6 Id. (citations omitted).
1"7 Id.; see, e.g., In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (11), 640 F.2d 49, 60 (7th
Cir. 1980); In re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734, 737 (10th Cir.
1976); see also Charles Woods Television Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 869
F.2d 1155, 1159 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that under Missouri law, party asserting
exception must show "something more substantial than suspicion, surmise, and
speculation"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 857 F.2d at 712 (noting that
government must show more than that attorney was target of grand jury
investigation); United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating
that government must offer competent evidence of the crime or fraud and cannot
simply rely on the indictment to establish a prima facie showing); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings in Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that
government must establish more than "a strong suspicion").
"See Silbert, supra note 50, at 361-62. According to Silbert:
The Supreme Court has said that the mere charge of fraud will not
suffice to destroy the attorney-client privilege; rather, the party seeking to
overcome the privilege must establish a prima facie case of a continuing or
contemplated crime or fraud. The courts have done little to explain how
detailed the showing must be.
Id. (footnote omitted). Indeed, the Clark decision itself provides little guidance, as
Professor Fried has noted:
In Clark not only had a prima facie case been established, but the juror's
perjury had been so abundantly proven by independent evidence that the
admission of evidence concerning discussions in the jury room would, if
erroneous, have been harmless. The opinion thus provides little guidance as to
the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to overcome the privilege.
Fried, supra note 13, at 463 (footnote omitted).
"9 See United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Feldberg,
862 F.2d'622, 625 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States
v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971). As Professor Gergacz
commented:
A court in its review of the crime-fraud exception contention is not to establish
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definition in Black's Law Dictionary,2 to the effect that a prima facie
showing is sufficient proof that "will support [a] finding if evidence to the
contrary is disregarded."'2 Courts have also characterized the prima facie
showing as "evidence which, if believed by the fact finder, would be
sufficient to support a finding that the elements of the crime-fraud
exception were met."'" Other courts view the prima facie showing as being
the equivalent of probable cause."
Several courts have articulated less stringent standards. One court has
said that the prima facie showing must raise "more than a strong suspicion
... but it need not be as strong as that needed to effect an arrest or secure
an indictment," i.e., probable cause. 24 Another court relied on only
"substantial evidence."' 2 The prima facie showing has also been described
as sufficient for "reasonable cause to believe" that an attorney's services
were employed in furtherance of a crime or fraud. 26 Yet other courts
a criminal conviction. Nor is the court to anticipate a possible criminal
indictment or charge being filed concerning the improper activity. Instead, the
prima facie showing should establish an abuse of the attorney-client
relationship sufficient to outweigh the important justice considerations behind
the privilege.
Gergacz, supra note 10, at 1677.
120 The "prima facie case" is defined as "[s]uch as will prevail until contradicted
and overcome by other evidence. A case which has proceeded upon sufficientproof
to that stage where it will support finding if evidence to contrary is disregarded."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1189-90 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
"I Id.; see, e.g., In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d
1235, 1242 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter ofFine, 641
F.2d at 203; Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1972); see also
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1976)
("[W]hile aprimafacie showing need not be such as to actually prove the disputed
fact, it must be such as to subject the opposing party to the risk of non-persuasion
if the evidence as to the disputed fact is left unrebutted.") (footnote omitted).
' Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1992); see also
United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 541 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1987); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d
at 399; In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 815.
" See, e.g., In re John Doe, Inc., 13 F.3d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 798 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1986).
124 In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 165 (6th Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted).
" United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 1972).
126 United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996); see also In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Grand Jury
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consider the prima facie showing to be evidence sufficient to warrant
further inquiry or which would require an explanation of the circumstances
from the privilege holder. 27
These are more than simple semantic differences. Rather, the different
formulations reflect a fundamental conflict among the courts concerning
the evidentiary threshold that must be met before the attorney-client
privilege will be invaded."' This basic conflict would seem ripe for
resolution by the Supreme Court, but the Court has thus far declined to
provide authoritative guidance on this essential issue.
1 29
2. The Evidence That Can Be Considered
in Regard to the Prima Facie Showing
a. Independent Evidence
One issue that the Supreme Court addressed in Zolin v. United States30
was whether the prima facie showing could be predicated on the privileged
Proceedings, 867 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 1989); Appeal of Hughes, 633 F.2d 282,
291 (3d Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit has described the "reasonable cause"
standard as being "more than suspicion but less than apreponderance of evidence."
Chen, 99 F.3d at 1503. The Second Circuit has suggested that "reasonable basis to
suspect!' is tantamount to a prima facie showing, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984), or to
probable cause, see Avramides v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., No. 87 Civ. 5732, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1647 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
" See United States v. Davis, 1 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Feldberg,
862 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1988).
" Indeed, the trend has been seen as a lowering of the evidentiary standard to
be met. See Karen I. Rolandelli, Note, Confidentiality and the Crime Fraud
Exception, 3 GEO. J. LEGALETHICS 139, 143-44 (1989) ("[C]ourts have broadened
the crime-fraud exception by steadily lowering the procedural threshold for its
application. In the last ten years, some courts have even abandoned the prima facie
test and have replaced it with a lower standard of proof .... .") (footnote omitted);
see also Massing, supra note 8, at 1218 ("The courts may be likely to require a
relatively low standard of proof.... [I]f the client has behaved legally, no harm
will come from disclosure. If, on the other hand, the client has abused the attorney-
client relationship, then there is no basis for the privilege.").
29 Indeed, in its opinion in Zolin v. United States, 491 U.S. 554 (1989), the
Court recognized the confusion and controversy resulting from the phrase "prima
facie case" as used in Clarkv. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1932). See Zolin, 491
U.S. at 563 n.7. Nevertheless, the Court specifically declined to decide "the
quantum of proof necessary ultimately to establish the applicability of the crime-
fraud exception." Id.
130Zolin, 491 U.S. at 554.
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communication itself rather than on evidence extrinsic to the attorney-
client communication."' The rule that the prima facie showing must be
based on "independent" evidence originated in the Ninth Circuit's decision
in United States v. Shewfelt. "2 Precedent for the rule was uncertain, 33 and
131 Justice Blackmun framed the issue as follows:
The specific question presented is whether the applicability of the crime-
fraud exception must be established by "independent evidence" (i.e.,
without reference to the content of the contested communications
themselves), or, alternatively, whether the applicability of that exception
can be resolved by an in camera inspection of the allegedly privilege
material.
Zolin, 491 U.S. at 556.
132 United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1972). The court in
Shewfelt held that "before the privileged status of these communications can be
lifted, the government must fi st establish aprima facie case of fraud independently
of the said communications." Id. at 840. The Ninth Circuit adhered to its rule in
Shewfelt in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 1989), and
UnitedStates v. Zolin, 842 F.2d 1135, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), af)d inpart
and vacated inpart, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
133 The Ninth Circuit's decision appears to have been predicated on the
requirement of a prima facie showing in Clark, 289 U.S. at 15, and relied on two
previous decisions of the Second and Fourth Circuits, neither of which addressed
the necessity of evidence extrinsic to the privileged communication.
In the first, United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1939), a former attorney
for the defendant testified at trial concerning the defendant's control of several
mining companies whose stock was alleged to have been sold fraudulently. The
court upheld the conclusion that the communications between the attorney and the
defendant were within the crime-fraud exception. See id. at 40. The court noted that
the government was required to establish a prima facie case and stated that "here
such a case has already been established against Bob through Israel, named as co-
conspirator, who testified before [the attorney] took the stand as to details of the
stock-selling campaign." Id. The court also noted that the attorney's testimony was
not the only evidence of the defendant's involvement. "The commission of the
crime was not proved by [the attorney's] testimony alone, although there is no
doubt of its extensive and damaging character." Id. Thus, while it appears that there
was independent evidence of the defendant's participation in the fraudulent
scheme, there does not appear to be a requirement for such evidence as a predicate
for the prima facie case.
In the second decision, Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.
1967), it appears that in evaluating the government's prima facie showing, the
district court examined the documents to which privilege had been asserted. As the
court of appeals noted, "[t]he court heard argument of counsel, examined the
controversial papers, considered other evidence available to the grand jury, and
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it has generally not been followed.'34 The independent evidence restriction
has also been criticized as being too great an impediment to the search for
truth'
35
Against this background, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Zolin that "[a] per se rule that the communications in question may never
be considered creates.., too great an impediment to the proper functioning
of the adversary process. 1 36 Accordingly, it is now settled that a court may
denied the motion to quash." Id. at 144. Rather than support a requirement for
independent evidence, the Union Camp decision appears to uphold consideration
of the privileged document as part of the prima facie showing.
" The Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Shewfelt rule, finding the
requirement of independent evidence to be unsupported. See In re Berkley & Co.,
629 F.2d 548,553 n.9 (8th Cir. 1980). Other courts of appeal have also upheld and
engaged in in camera inspections of privileged documents. See In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037-39 (2d Cir.
1984); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 491 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Sept 1975
Grand Jury Term, 532 F.3d 734, 738 (10th Cir. 1976).
135 For example, one commentator observed:
[T]he best-frequently the only-evidence to prove that a communicationwas
made in connection with a future wrong lies in its own content. Thus if the
apparently privileged statements are admitted in deciding upon the
exception, the consequence is the incurable harm of unjustified disclosure
in those instances where allegations of criminal purpose turn out to be
unsupported. On the other hand, if the privilege must be honored unless the
exception is overwhelmingly established by other evidence, the exception
could operate in but few cases.
Note, supra note 85, at 736. However, one commentary suggested that such a
showing could be made by
facts tending to show that the particular crime or fraud charged could not
normally have been committed in the absence of legal assistance; the
number and duration of meetings between attorney and client at or about the
time of the alleged crime or fraud; nonprivileged documents which relate
to the alleged crime or fraud; the nature and duration of the attorney-client
relationship generally; and admissions by the client to third parties.
Callan & David, supra note 59, at 349.
136 Zolin, 491 U.S. at 569. The Zolin case arose from the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") investigation of L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of
Scientology. In the course of the investigation, the IRS sought production of two
tapes which had been filed with the district court in connection with other litigation
involving Mr. Hubbard's wife and which the district court found were privileged.
In support of its motion to enforce the summons, the IRS presented two
declarations by one of its agents. One of the affidavits contained excerpts of a
transcript of the tapes, which the IRS agent claimed he had obtained from a third-
1998-99] 1249
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
consider the content of the privileged conversation in determining whether
the crime-fraud exception applies to an otherwise privileged communica-
tion.
The abandonment of the independent evidence restriction has been
criticized as yet a further lowering of the evidentiary standards for
invocation ofthe crime-fraud exception and thus weakening the safeguards
envisioned by Justice Cardozo in Clark v. United States.37 It has also been
suggested that with the loosening of the standards there is a risk that the
exception will swallow the privilege."'
party source. The district court found that the IRS had not made a prima facie
showing sufficient to defeat the privilege. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the
district court's determination that the IRS had not made a prima facie showing was
affined on the basis of the court's review of the "independent" evidence. See id.
at 558-61.
I"' Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932); see Ann M. St. Peter-Griffith,
Note, Abusing the Privilege: The Crime Fraud Exception to Rule 501 of the
FederalRules ofEvidence, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 259,270 (1993) ("By abolishing
the 'independent evidence' rule, the Supreme Court diminished some of the
safeguards Justice Cardozo imposed in Clark to establish workable parameters for
the rule"). Even before Zolin was decided, Professor Fried remarked that "[i]n
recent years, the courts have lowered the evidentiary standard that the opponent of
the privilege must meet to overcome the privilege and generally have rejected any
requirement that there be evidence of fraud independent of the confidential
communication itself." Fried, supra note 13, at 461-62 (footnote omitted).
138 Silbert remarks:
As one court aptly stated, there is a danger that "in giving practical
application to the [crime-fraud exception] rule 'the secret must be told in
order to see whether it ought to be kept."' As another court has more
recently written, "where disclosure is sought for the purpose of determining
whether such misbehavior has occurred, [it] involves an entirely different
problem-an exception which threatens to swallow the rule."
Silbert, supra note 50, at 365-66 (quoting Hamil & Co. v. England, 50 Mo. App.
338,348 (1892); Moody v. Internal Revenue Serv., 654 F.2d 795, 800 n.17 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)). According to Fried:
In the great majority of instances, the commission of a crime or fraud is the
ultimate issue in the case, and the attorney-client communication is relevant
precisely as evidence of such commission. A mere allegation of fraud
should not be enough to overcome the privilege, however. It is desirable to
avoid the circularity of relying upon the confidential communication itself
to prove the client's fraudulent intent, which in turn serves as the necessary
justification for the disclosure. This difficulty.., is central to the modem
history of the crime-fraud exception.




A second evidentiary issue is whether the required prima facie showing
must be based on competent, admissible evidence. Such a requirement was
suggested by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Dyer,39 which held that
"when the government can by competent evidence establish a prima facie
case that an attorney was being used in the commission of a crime there is
no privilege."''
14
Nonetheless, privilege holders have not been successful in asserting
such a requirement. 4 ' District courts are not restricted by the rules of
evidence in determining preliminary questions of applicability of
privileges.'42 Courts also regularly rely on affidavits summarizing grand
jury testimony or other evidence 43 and on a "good faith statement"
Court rejected the independent evidence rule in Zolin.
19 United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983).
140 Id. at 178.
141 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1989).
142 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a):
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall
be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)
[addressing relevancy conditioned on fulfillment of a condition of fact]. In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(d), governing applicability
of the rules of evidence, similarly states, "The rules (other than with respect to
privileges) do not apply in the following situations: (1) Preliminary Questions of
Fact. The determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of
evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under Rule 104." FED. R.
EVID. 1101 (d). Thus, the Fourth Circuit inn re GrandJury Subpoena stated, "This
court and others, when reviewing whether the crime-fraud exception applies, have
permitted district courts to rely on evidence not ordinarily admissible at trial." In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d at 127.
143 See United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 199 6); In re Richard
Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Thursday
Special Grand Jury Sept. Term 1991,33 F.3d 342,345 (4th Cir. 1994); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena 92-1(SJ), 31 F.3d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 867 F.2d 539,541 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury (G.L No. 87-03-
A), 845 F.2d 896, 898 (1 lth Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d
1223, 1228 (1 lth Cir. 1987); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecurn, 798 F.2d
32,33 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395,400 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings-Gordon, 722 F.2d 303, 309 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Grand
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of government counsel.'" Indeed, this was the procedure employed in
Zolin. 45
Unquestionably, the district courts have broad discretion in deciding
whether the attorney-client privilege will be overborne by the crime-fraud
exception. 46 They are not prohibited by the rules of evidence from
considering evidence that would be inadmissible at trial when determining
questions of privilege. Nevertheless, although courts enjoy wide latitude in
the type of information given consideration, the courts should be more
wary in relying solely on the representations of government agents, which
are not subject to testing or rebuttal, because the proceedings are usually
conducted exparte and in camera with little or no meaningful notice to the
privilege holder of the allegations of abuse.
B. The Nature of the Proceedings
Judicial determinations of the applicability of the crime-
fraud exception are routinely made by district courts in camera. When
privileged documents or testimony are sought by the grand jury, the
court's in camera review is initiated by the government's ex parte
application.
These practices result from the long-standing preference for in camera
review as the means for determining questions of privilege and from the
long-established policy of grand jury secrecy. Although the procedures
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Zolin attempt to balance these policies
with a concern for judicial economy and the interests of privilege holders,
the confidentiality of attorney-client communications is regularly pierced
with little orno meaningful opportunity for the privilege holderto be heard.
How one reacts to this emerging fact of judicial life depends almost
entirely on how one weighs these competing interests.
Jury Proceeding, 674 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1982).
" In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d at 1226; see also In re Vargas, 723
F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983).
4 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 558 (1989).
'"See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1992); In
re GrandJury Subpoena, 884 F.2d at 127; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 857 F.2d
710,712 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury SubpoenaDuces Tecum, 773 F.2d 204,
206 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d at 399-400; In re Vargas, 723
F.2d at 1467; In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 1980); In re
September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734,737 (10th Cir. 1976).
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1. In Camera Proceedings
The Supreme Court has long made clear its approval of in camera
review as the preferred means of determining questions of privilege. 147 In
this connection, the Supreme Court has agreed with the observation that
"'in camera inspection... is a smaller intrusion upon the confidentiality
of the attorney-client relationship than is public disclosure." 48 Proponents
of the privilege have also availed themselves of in camera review in
support of their assertion of the privilege.
49
When assertions of the crime-fraud exception are made by the
government in conjunction with a grand jury investigation, as is increas-
ingly the case, other powerful social interests in grand jury secrecy also
weigh heavily in favor of in camera proceedings. Indeed, the confidential-
ity of matters occurring before the grand jury is deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence. 5 ° The grand jury, whose existence is recognized in the
147 See Kerr v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394,
405-06 (1976) ("[T]his Court has long held the view that in camera review is a
highly appropriate and useful means of dealing with claims of governmental
privilege."); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) ("[W]e find it
difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in
confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by
production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection a
district court will be obliged to provide.").
1
48 Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572 (quoting Fried, supra note 13, at 467).
149 See In re Horn, 976 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1992) (" 'The proper pro-
cedure for asserting the attorney-client privilege as to particular documents, or
portions thereof, [is] for [the individual] to submit them in camera for the court's
inspection, providing an explanation of how the information fits within the
privilege.' ") (quotingIn re GrandJury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359,362 (9th Cir.
1982)); Clarke v. American Commerce Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir.
1992) ("A district court may conduct an in camera inspection of alleged
confidential communications to determine whether the attorney-client privilege
applies.").
The Supreme Court has observed:
The institution of the grand jury is deeply rooted in Anglo-American
history. In England, the grand jury served for centuries both as a body of
accusers sworn to discover and present for trial persons suspected of
criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against arbitrary and
oppressive governmental action. In this country the Founders thought the
grand jury so essential to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth
Amendment that federal prosecution can only be instituted by "a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." The grand jury's historic
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Constitution,"' is empowered with extraordinary authority to conduct
broad ranging investigations of possible violations of law. 5 2 To protect
both the integrity of the grand jury's investigation and the rights of those
who are the subjects of investigation," proceedings before the grand jury
functions survive to this day. Its responsibilities continue to include both the
determination whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been
committed and the protection against unfounded criminal prosecutions.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-43 (1974) (footnotes and citations
omitted); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687 (1972); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
' The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court has viewed this authority as
"show[ing] the high place [the grand jury] held as an instrument of justice."
Costello, 350 U.S. at 362.
152The grand jury has been described as follows:
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition,
the scope of whose inquires is not to be limited narrowly by questions or
propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by
doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to
an accusation of crime.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919). Thus, the Court said in United
States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292 (1991):
The grand jury occupies a unique role in our criminal justice system. It
is an investigatory body charged with the responsibility of determining
whether or not a crime has been committed. Unlike this Court, whose
jurisdiction is predicated on a specific case or controversy, the grand jury
"can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even
just because it wants assurance that it is not." The function of the grand jury
is to inquire into all information that might possibly bearon its investigation
until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has
occurred. As a necessary consequence of its investigatory function, the
grand jury paints with a broad brush. "A grand jury investigation 'is not
fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all
witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been
committed."'
Id. at 297 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has noted in this regard:
Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution; it serves
the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and
the accused... to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or
was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.
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are held in secret, 4 and that secrecy is codified in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.155 Thus, the need for in camera review ofaprima facie
showing based on matters occurring before a grand jury is compelling. 56
Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
15 The "'long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings in the federal courts"' has been recognized by the Supreme Court.
United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418,424 (1983) (quotingUnited States
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958)). "The grand jury as a public
institution serving the community might suffer if those testifying today knew that
the secrecy of their testimony would be lifted tomorrow." Proctor & Gamble, 356
U.S. at 682. The Court explained in Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops
Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979):
[I]f preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective witnesses
would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against
whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. Moreover, witnesses who
appeared before the grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and frankly,
as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements. There also
would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to
influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Finally, by
preserving the secrecy of the proceedings, we assure that persons who are
accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.
Id. at 219.
"I Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) states the general rule of grand
jury secrecy:
A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording
device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the
government, or any person to whom disclosure is made [as an agent of the
attorney for the government pursuant to Rule 6(e)(3)(A)] shall not disclose
matters occurring before the grand jury.
FED. R. CRIM. P. Rule 6(e)(2). Additionally, Rule 6(d) restricts those who may be
present during grand jury proceedings. See id. Rule 6(d). With respect to this
provision, the Supreme Court has noted that Rule 6(d)
is designed to guard the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings, prevent
intimidation of jurors, and guarantee that the grand jury is given the
opportunity to make an independent examination ofthe evidence andrender
its probable cause and charging determinations free of undue prosecutorial
influence.
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
156 See In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 490 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Here, the
materials contained in the in camera submission are not on the verge of disclosure
to Doe Corp. and may, in fact, never be disclosed. An ongoing interest in grand
jury secrecy is at stake."). Thus, as the Second Circuit stated in In re John Doe
Corp., upholding the use of in camera proceedings:
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For these reasons, in camera review is now the accepted procedure for
evaluation of the crime-fraud exception.1 7 However, the Supreme Court
has recognized that even in camera review may result in disclosure of that
which the privilege was meant to protect. 158 The Court also recognized the
We recognize that appellants cannot make factual arguments about
materials they have not seen and to that degree they are hampered in
presenting their case. The alternatives, however, are sacrificing the secrecy
of the grand jury or leaving the issue unresolved at this critical juncture. We
believe those alternatives less desirable than the in camera submission
utilized by Judge Sifton.... Leaving the issue unresolved, on the other
hand, would permit wholly untested claims of privilege to obstruct
investigations of federal crimes. There is a public interest in respecting
confidentiality of communications by clients to their attorneys, in
maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings and in investigating and
prosecuting federal crimes. Where these interests conflict or the validity of
privilege claims based on these interests are challenged, the limitations on
adversary argument caused by in camera submissions are clearly
outweighed by the benefits of obtaining a judicial resolution of a
preliminary evidentiary issue while preserving confidentiality.
Id.; accordIn re Grand Jury Proceedings in the Matter ofFreeman, 708 F.2d 1571,
1576 (1 1th Cir. 1983) ("It is settled.., that cautious use of in camera proceedings
is appropriate to resolve disputed issues of privilege. The need to preserve the
secrecy of an ongoing grand jury investigation is of paramount importance.")
(citations omitted).
157 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377,379 (9th Cir. 1996); In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1989); In re Impounded Case
(Law Firm), 879 F.2d 1211, 1214 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805
F.2d 155, 168-69 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
Sept. 15, 1983,731 F.2d 1032, 1036 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461,
1467 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter ofFreeman, 708
F.2d at 1576; In re Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 707 F.2d 663, 670 (2d Cir. 1983); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, 674 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Sealed Case,
676 F.2d 793, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (HI), 640
F.2d 49, 57 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir.
1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1979); In re
Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1977); In re September 1975 Grand Jury
Term, 532 F.2d 734,738 (10th Cir. 1976); Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d
143, 144 (4th Cir. 1967).
's5 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,570 (1989). The Court explained:
A blanket rule allowing in camera review as a tool for determining the
applicability of the crime-fraud exception.., would place the policy of
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riskthat "opponents of the privilege" couldusethe in camera procedure "to
engage in groundless fishing expeditions, with the district courts as their
unwitting (and perhaps unwilling) agents."159
In response, the Supreme Court agreed with the view of several of the
courts of appeal that the proponent of the crime-fraud exception should be
required to make a preliminary showing that in camera review is
justified."6 Because the objective of this preliminary showing is quite
different from that required to overcome the privilege,161 the Supreme
Court has said that the preliminary showing needed to trigger in camera
review "need not be a stringent one." 62
The required showing is "'a factual basis adequate to support a good
faith belief by a reasonable person' that in camera review of the materials
may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception
applies."163 In essence, this operates as a prima facie showing of the prima
facie showing.
The "good faith belief" standard, which inthe Court's view "strikes the
correct balance,"'16' has been implemented by the courts of appeals.'
65
However, simply because the requisite preliminary showing is made does
not require that an in camera review be undertaken. The district court
protecting open and legitimate disclosure between attorneys and clients at
undue risk. There is also reason to be concerned about the possible due




16 See id. The Court specifically noted the decision of the Second Circuit in In
re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d at 490, and of the District of Columbia Circuit in In
re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 815, in this regard. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 570.
,61 See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 96 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[Alt a
very minimum, we must recognize that the objectives of the two proceedings are
completely different. One merely seeks in camera examination of documents by
the court; this is a comparatively non-dispositive procedural way station. The other
seeks to break the seal of a highly protected privilege.").
162 Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
163 Id. (citation omitted).
16 Id.
165 See United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena 92-1(SJ), 31 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 1994); Haines, 975 F.2d at 96;
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1992); United States
v. De La Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1992).
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retains discretion to decide whether to conduct an in camera review," but
as a practical matter, in camera review ordinarily follows a satisfactory
preliminary showing.
1 67
In conducting its in camera review, the district court's inquiry must be
a focused one. For example, only documents generated during the alleged
criminal scheme should be subject to the court's review. 6 Further, the
district court should examine each document to which the crime-fraud
exception is claimed to apply. 69 The court should also articulate the basis
on which it was determined that disclosure is warranted by the crime-fraud
exception.170
' As the Supreme Court explained in Zolin:
Once [the preliminary] showing is made, the decisionwhether to engage
in in camera review rests in the sound discretion of the district court. The
court should make that decision in light of the facts and circumstances of
the particular case, including, among other things, the volume of materials
the district court has been asked to review, the relative importance to the
case of the alleged privileged information, and the likelihood that the
evidence produced through in camera review, together with other available
evidence then before the curt, will establish that the crime-fraud exception
does apply. The district court is also free to defer its in camera review if it
concludes that additional evidence in support of the crime-fraud exception
may be available that is not allegedly privileged, and that production of the
additional evidence will not unduly disrupt or delay the proceedings.
Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572.
167 Of course, the district court is also free to conclude that the prima facie
showing to defeat the privilege has been made based on the preliminary showing.
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Thursday Special Grand Jury Sept. Term,
33 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 1994).
168 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena 92-1(S), 31 F.3d at 831 ("[T]he district
court erred by failing to limit the scope of its in camera review to documents
generated during the course of the Corporation's alleged criminal scheme.").
161 See In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We therefore
remand this matter to the district court for an examination of each document under
the proper standard."); In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 168 (6th Cir.
1986) ("[T]he only way the district court can determine if any of the documents are
subjectto a subpoenaunder the crime-fraud exception is by reviewing them."); see,
e.g., In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 486-87 (2d Cir. 1982); In re National
Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificate Litig., 116 F.R.D. 297, 300
(C.D. Cal. 1987).
"' See, e.g., In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d at 41.
If production is ordered, the court shall specify the factual basis for the
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2. The Opportunity to Rebut the Ex Parte Showing
Out of concern for preserving the secrecy of grand jury proceedings
and concern for the avoidance of preliminary "mini-trials" of issues of
privilege, 171 in camera review of the prima facie showing has been upheld
against due process challenge. The exparte character of the proceedings
raises other significant due process issues, however.It has been recognized that consideration of the in camera submission
"'deprives one party to a proceeding of a full opportunity to be heard on an
issue' and its use is justified only by a compelling interest."'" The absence
of notice of the basis of the crime-fraud claim further aggravates the
inability ofthe privilege holderto meaningfully respond and to preserve the
crime or fraud that the documents or communications are deemed to have
furthered, which of the parties asserting claims of privilege possessed a
criminal or fraudulent purpose with respect to those documents or
communications, and, if appropriate, whether the crime-fraud exception
applies to an innocent joint privilege-holder.
Id.
17' As Judge Wright observed in In re Sealed Case:
In making this determination [whether the possibility that a privileged
relationship has been abused is sufficient to alter the balance of costs and
benefits that supports the privilege] courts will not be able to receive a
complete adversary presentation of the issues, since one of the parties will
not be privy to the information at issue. Any system that requires courts to
make highly refined judgments-perhaps concerning volumes of
documents-will most likely collapse under its own weight. And it would
run afoul of the basic prescription[:] "Any holding that would saddle a
grand jury with mini trials and preliminary showings would assuredly
impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in fair and
expeditious administration of the criminal laws."
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Unites States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)) (footnote omitted); accordIn re Vargas, 723 F.2d
1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[The] determination can be made ex-parte and a
'preliminary mini-trial' is not necessary."); In re September 1975 Grand Jury
Term, 532 F.2d 734, 737 (1Oth Cir. 1976) ("Proceedings related to the enforcement
of a grand jury subpoena may not be converted into a preliminary trial on the
merits.").
"7 In re John Doe, Inc., 13 F.3d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting In re John
Doe Corp., 675 F.2d at 490).
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privilege. ' 73 The court is also deprived of the robust factual development
and legal argument necessary for an informed judicial decision.
The legitimate need to preserve grand jury secrecy has been found to
be a sufficiently compelling interest to outweigh and cut off the ability of
the privilege holder to be heard. 74 Thus, courts have overwhelmingly
rejected due process claims where disclosure of the government's
preliminary or prima facie showings risked compromising the secrecy of
ongoing grand jury proceedings. 75
Although such exparte, in camera proceedings appear to be the norm,
courts have exercised their discretion to allow the party opposing disclo-
sure to offer contrary evidence or at least to argue that the privilege should
be maintained.'7 6 Furthermore, where the need for grand jury secrecy has
173 One commentator notes:
In camera inspection of ostensibly privileged documents is common on
motions to quash grand jury subpoenas. In that context, the case for
disclosure is not necessarily based solely on the attorney-client
communications. Rather, the government may also submit affidavits and
transcripts of grand jury testimony exparte, and government attorneys will
argue for the applicability of the exception in chambers. As a result, the
attorney and the client cannot meaningfully dispute the court's finding that
the government has established a prima facie case of fraud.
Fried, supra note 13, at 467.
" See, e.g., In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at 161-62 ("To determine
whether in camera inspection was proper... the government's interest must be
balanced against the interests of the appellants. We believe that the balance in these
types of cases should always be weighted presumptively toward the government
when the targets of a grand jury investigation are requesting disclosure of grand
jury testimony for use in that proceeding.") (citations omitted). The court noted,
however, that this was not a case "where the parties have no notice or idea of the
basis for the government's request." Id.
" See, e.g., In re Grand Jury No. 94-1, C.A. No. 95-50302, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2148 (9th Cir. Jan. 31, 1996); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Thursday
Special Grand Jury Sept. Term, 33 F.3d 342, 353 (4th Cir. 1994); In re John Doe,
Inc., 13 F.3d at 635; In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 884 F.2d 124, 126-27 (4th Cir.
1989); In reAntitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at 162; In re Vargas, 723 F.2d at 1467;
In re Grand Jury Proceedings-Gordon, 722 F.2d 303, 310 (6th Cir. 1983); In re
John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d at 490; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 674 F.2d 309, 310
(4th Cir. 1982); In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (I), 640 F.2d 49, 56 (7th Cir.
1980); In re September 1975 Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d at 737.
176 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d at 353 ("The district court's
decision to review the government's and the appellants' submissions in camera was
an appropriate exercise of discretion.... ."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena 92-1 (SJ),
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abated or is not implicated, courts have properly allowed the privilege
holder to be heard."r
31 F.3d 826,830 (9thCir. 1994) ("[T]he record does not reflect whether the district
court realized it had the discretion to consider the evidence offered by the
Corporation in deciding whether to exercise its discretion to order in camera
review."); In re John Doe, Inc., 13 F.3d at 637 ("The district court proceeded to an
in camera review of the allegedly privileged communication only after oral
argument and after the threshold showing required by Zolin was made."); In re
Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622, 626 (7thCir. 1988) ("Here, as in the law of discrimination,
a prima facie case must be defined with regard to its function: to require the
adverse party, the one with superior access to the evidence and in the best position
to explain things, to come forward with that explanation."); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings in Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing
attorney to testify at evidentiary hearing in response to government's allegation that
his services had been used in furtherance of his client's marijuana smuggling).
Thus, as the court stated in Appeal ofHughes, 633 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1981):
Before the Government can justify interrogation of attorneys, or their
agents, with respect to matters which are prima facie work product, on the
ground that the work product involved misconduct, it must demonstrate a
reasonable basis for such a belief and the opposing attorney must be
afforded an opportunity to respond to the government's allegations.
Id. at 291.
" As was stated in Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992):
If the party seeking to apply the exception has made its initial showing, then
a more formal procedure is required than that entitling plaintiff to in camera
review. The importance ofthe privilege... as well as fundamental concepts
of due process require that the party defending the privilege be given the
opportunity to be heard, by evidence and argument, at the hearing seeking
an exception to the privilege. We are concerned that the privilege be given
adequate protection, and this can be assured only when the district court
undertakes a thorough consideration of the issue, with the assistance of
counsel on both sides of the dispute.
We therefore must agree with petitioners' contention that where a fact
finder undertakes to weigh evidence in a proceeding seeking an exception
to the privilege, the party invoking the privilege has the absolute right to be
heard by testimony and argument
Id. at 96-97 (citations omitted); accordIn re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (2d
Cir. 1977) (finding that government's interest in secrecy was minimal because the
government was going to disclose grand jury materials to the witness during grand
jury testimony); see In re A.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2, 7-8 (D. Kan. 1985)
(giving privilege holder opportunity to make written submission in opposition to
crime-fraud exception). Commentary is in accord with this view. See Note, supra
note 85, at 740. This Note states:
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To be sure, there are situations in which the integrity of the grand
jury's process warrant in camera proceedings in which the privilege holder
is foreclosed from responding to the government's proffered justification
of the crime-fraud exception. This procedure should be reserved for only
the exceptional case under the most compelling circumstances where the
confidentiality ofthe grandjury's proceedings are directly at stake. Instead,
even in instances where the grand jury's investigation is ongoing, a
controlled means of providing meaningful notice and opportunity to be
heard should be afforded the privilege holder before client confidences are
invaded.
Im. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The confidentiality of attorney-client communications is the oldest and
perhaps most venerated evidentiary privilege in our jurisprudence. Client
confidentiality is deemed to be so central to the attorney-client relationship
that the principles of ethics governing the legal profession enjoin attorneys
to maintain confidentiality both as a matter of fiduciary obligation and as
a means of ensuring the proper functioning of the legal system.' Despite
Once this burden [of persuading the court to examine the privileged
communication] has been met and the second step reached, it would seem
that the ultimate burden of persuasion ought to return to the person claiming
privilege, since in theory the future crime or tort exception is simply an
expression of the general requirements that define and justify a given
privilege.
Id. Jennison states:
The adverse effect of denying a client's claim of privilege without affording
him or her an opportunity to be heard may be justified in the context of a
grand jury proceeding because of the time constraints of such a proceeding.
In addition, because of the confidential nature of the proceedings, the
damage suffered by the client when his or her communications are disclosed
may be minimal. However, neither ofthese considerations is present at trial,
and there is, therefore, no basis for allowing a mereprimafacie showing to
dispel the client's privilege within the trial context.
Jennison, supra note 38, at 919.
1 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and
the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the
lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to
employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his
lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that
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the sanctity accordedthe attorney-client privilege, increased reliance on the
crime-fraud exception to the privilege as a means of invalidating the
attorney-client privilege and compelling an attorney to be a witness against
a client challenges the fundamental trust that is the essence of the attorney-
client relationship.
Few would deny that the attorney-client relationship canbe abused, and
few would argue that the privilege should serve as "a cloak of secrecy" to
shield that abuse. Indeed, when the attorney becomes an ally of the client's
crime or fraud (knowingly or not), there is no principled basis for
maintaining the privilege.
volunteered by his client A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts
of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full
advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his
independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important
from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical
obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his
client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper
representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal
assistance.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1983). The Preamble to
theModel Rules of Professional Conduct similarly provides: "A lawyer can be sure
that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because
people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal
obligations, when they know their communications will be private." Preamble to
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1998). Thus, the comment to Model
Rule 1.6 states:
The observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate
confidential information of the client not only facilitates the full
development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also
encourages people to seek early legal assistance.
Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers in order to determine
what their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations,
deemed to be legal and correct. The common law recognizes that the
client's confidences must be protected from disclosure. Based upon
experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given,
and the law is upheld.
A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the
lawyermaintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation.
The client is thereby encouraged to communicate fully and frankly with the
lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.
Id. Rule 1.6 cmt.
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Nevertheless, while there may be general agreement with these broad
themes, their implementation has proven troublesome. Thus, courts have
fashioned procedures that allow the privilege to be pierced on grounds of
which the privilege holder is not told, based on pleadings which the
privilege holder is not shown, and in proceedings in which the privilege
holder does not participate.
By focusing almost exclusively on the intent of the client in determin-
ing whether the attorney-client communication was in furtherance of a
crime or fraud, courts have often failed to inquire whether there is
substantive evidence that the attorney-client relationship was in fact abused
or whether the attorney's services in fact furthered the client's unlawful
scheme. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has gone so far as to suggest that even
advice from counsel that hinders a client's illegal plan may nonetheless be
in furtherance of a crime or fraud.179 If that were the case, virtually all of
a lawyer's client counseling could be subject to the crime-fraud exception
simply because the client later chose to ignore the advice.' Additionally,
because the applicability of the crime-fraud exception is determined post
hoc and often on the basis of the client's subsequent conduct, there is
significant uncertainty in virtually every attorney-client communication
whether confidentiality will be preserved.
Further, out of a well-founded respect for the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings, courts have allowed the prima facie showing in support of the
crime-fraud exception to be made ex parte without disclosure of the
grounds to the privilege holder. Indeed, the privilege holder generally does
not participate in these proceedings which, if a minimal preliminary
showing is made, are conducted in camera.
However great society's interest may be in the integrity of the grand
jury, society's very substantial interest in fostering attorney-client
communication should not be thrown over so easily. Instead, in those
instances in which grand jury secrecy is not implicated (i.e., in civil
litigation) or when the importance of grand jury secrecy has abated (i.e.,
after the grand jury's investigation has concluded in the return of an
indictment or a declination of prosecution), there is simply no justification
for exparte proceedings.
179 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377 (9th Cir. 1996).
"' As Elihu Root once observed, "[a]bout half the practice of a decent lawyer
[rests upon] telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop."
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., DoingtheRight Thing, 70 WASH.U.L.Q. 691,699 (1992)
(quoting 1 PHILLIP JESSE [sic], ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938)).
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In cases where the interest in grand jury secrecy has vitality, other
considerations apply. The disclosure of privileged information to a court
in camera does not operate as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.181
In like fashion, a judicial determination of the applicability of the crime-
fraud exception on the basis of an exparte showing is not a final determi-
nation that privileged communications are subject to the crime-fraud
exception.1 2 Instead, the privilege holder may challenge the disclosure and
use of otherwise privileged communications either by seeking dismissal of
the indictment' or in a motion to suppress admission of the privileged
181 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568 (1989) ("We begin our
analysis by recognizing that disclosure of allegedly privileged materials to the
district court for purposes of determining the merits of a claim of privilege does not
have the legal effect of terminating the privilege.").
82 See United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1983).
[W]e find no rational basis for concluding that the privilege is defeated for
purposes of grand jury testimony but nonetheless is resurrected at trial....
Of course, if the evidence at trial persuades the trial court that the earlier
established crime or fraud exception is in fact not established the privilege
could be recognized.
Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (11), 640 F.2d
49, 57 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Crucial to our decision is the fact that the finding of prima
facie fraud based on the in camera submissions waives the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine only as to this Grand Jury subpoena and not in regard
to any other proceeding."); In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980).
The potential defendants have had no opportunity to challenge [the
government's showing] or to present contrary evidence which may show
events in a different light. In these circumstances, the district court's
preliminary determination that the documents are not privileged before the
grand jury is not binding on the parties at any subsequent trial.
Id. at 555; see also Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1222
(4th Cir. 1976) ("It may well be that during the trial of this case the throwsters will
be able to present sufficient evidence to make such a showing. Nothing in our
opinion here forecloses that possibility.").
183 For example, indictments have been challenged on the grounds that the
grand jury considered admissions made following grants of immunity or in
confessions that were suppressed as being involuntary. See In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Dated Dec. 7 & 8, 40 F.3d 1096, 1103 (10th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523,530 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Beery, 678 F.2d 856,
863 (10th Cir. 1982). As the Eighth Circuit explained in In re Berkley & Co.:
The determination that the documents are not privileged pertains only to the
grand jury proceedings. If indictments are returned and the matter proceeds
to trial, Berkley and any individual defendants are free to reassert their
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communications as well as any evidence derived from the communica-
tion.
184
Courts also have broad authority to restrict the admissibility of
attorney-client communications subject to the exception 85 and to fashion
claims of privilege to prevent use of the documents at trial. The ultimate
question of the relevance and admissibility of the documents at trial may
then be determined, but only after all parties have had an opportunity to be
heard. The district court's determination that there was prima facie evidence
of criminal or fraudulent activity was based solely on the documents before
it. The potential defendants have had no opportunity to challenge this
evidence or to present contrary evidence which may show events in a
different light. In these circumstances, the district court's preliminary
determination that the documents are not privileged before the grand jury
is not binding on the parties at any subsequent trial.
In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d at 555.
184See Federal Trade Conmn'n v. Gibson Prods. of San Antonio, Inc., 569 F.2d
900, 903 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that even though respondent has complied with
an administrative subpoena, "[i]f this case were decided in Gibson's favor, relief
would be available by an order requiring the FTC to return the subpoenaed
documents and to forbid use of the material in the adjudicatory hearing."); cf G.M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,359 (1977) ("The books and records
were returned, and the photocopies concededly have been destroyed; ... The
suppression issue, as to the books and records, obviously is premature and may be
considered if and when proceedings arise in which the Government seeks to use the
documents or information obtained from them.").
lS Thus, for example, the court in United States v. Dyer commented:
The district court has abundant resources to prevent abuse [of the crime-
fraud exception]. It can refuse to allow use of the evidence until its
relevance has first been established and given the concerns which we have
identified [regarding protection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel]
a district court can insist that this relevance be more than marginal....
[T]he district judge has the power to so control the trial and the sequence of
the evidence as to insure that evidence of a client's communication with his
lawyer be used only after more than marginal relevance at trial is first
demonstrated and only after it is convinced that the government effort to
obtain and use the evidence was in good faith and was not an abuse of the
grand jury or an effort to strike at opposing counsel.
Dyer, 722 F.2d at 178-79 (citations omitted); accordIn re September 1975 Grand
Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734,738 (10th Cir. 1976) ("Our examination of the disputed
documents convinces us that a potential relationship exists between the documents
and the charges under investigation. No more is required when the concern is with
a grand jury investigation.").
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a remedy for improper access to privileged information. 186 For example, the
court may direct the return of privileged documents and foreclose the
introduction of testimony concerning privileged communications.187
Nonetheless, simply restoring the privilege holder to the status quo ante
may not be a sufficient remedy since effectively, once the privilege has
been pierced, the damage is done. 8
However, if the privilege holder is able to demonstrate that the
government's exparte prima facie showing was faulty and therefore that
the crime-fraud exception should not apply, the burden would then fall on
the government to demonstrate that the evidence underlying the indictment
was derived from an independent source untainted by the privileged
communications. 9 If the government is not able to make this showing or
'
86 See Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc. v.United States, 506U.S. 9,13 (1992).
187 Thus, for example, in Church of Scientology, which arose following the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989), the Court
held that an appeal from an order enforcing an IRS summons was not moot despite
the fact that the privileged communications had been disclosed to the IRS during
the pendency of the appeal because a remedy could nevertheless be fashioned.
Even though it is now too late to prevent, or to provide a fully satisfactory
remedy for, the invasion of privacy that occurred when the IRS obtained the
information on the tapes, a court does have power to effectuate a partial
remedy by ordering the Government to destroy or return any and all copies
it may have in its possession.
Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13.
... As Earl J. Silbert has observed:
Whether or not the supposed privileged material can be used in a
criminal trial or other subsequentjudicial proceedings, the material has been
disclosed in a nonadversarial proceeding and confidentiality has been
breached. Even if disclosure is found unjustified, the harm may be
irreparable, particularly in light of possible derivative use of the alleged
crime-fraud information by the government.
Silbert, supra note 50, at 364; see also Jennison, supra note 38, at 938. Jennison
states:
If clients have evidence that may establish that their intent in seeking legal
advice was not fraudulent, they must be allowed to submit such evidence
before disclosure to the fact-finder. Apost-disclosure determination that the
clients' intent was not fraudulent is meaningless. The claim of privilege is
destroyed as soon as the material is disclosed to the trier of fact.
Id.
189 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964); United
States v. Schwimmer, 924 F.2d 443,446 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Williams,
817 F.2d 1136, 1138 (5th Cir. 1987). As the Court explained in Kastigar.
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if the privileged information is central to the proof of an element of the
government's case, the indictment should be dismissed lest any subsequent
conviction be reversed on appeal. 19°
Accordingly, the government shouldbe put to a choice when disclosure
of a privileged communication is sought at the investigatory stage. On the
one hand, the government can seek disclosure through an adversarial,
evidentiary proceeding in which the privilege holder is allowed to
participate in a meaningful way (i.e., with notice of the grounds of the
crime-fraud claim and an opportunity to rebut the prima facie showing). If
the privilege is defeated on the basis of such a hearing, the privilege holder
would be foreclosed from re-litigating the matter post-indictment.
If, on the other hand, the government elects to proceed by way of an ex
parte proceeding, in which the privilege holder has neither substantive
notice ofthe government's claim nor a meaningful opportunity to be heard,
the privilege holder would not be precluded from litigating the issue of the
crime-fraud exception post-indictment. If the privilege were upheld based
on the privilege holder's showing to rebut the claim of the crime-fraud
exception, the government wouldthenbe required to demonstrate that there
was an independent, untainted source of its evidence or else suffer
suppression of the tainted evidence and, possibly, dismissal of the
indictment.
This choice of proceeding should be left to the government, at least in
the first instance.191 The government is best positioned to evaluate both the
importance of the privileged information to the completion of the grand
jury's investigation and the relative importance of maintaining the secrecy
of the grand jury's proceedings. In either event, whether during the
This burden of proof... is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it
imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence
it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent
of the compelled testimony.
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
'90 For example, in United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the
court reversed a conviction based in part on evidence of a privileged conversation
between the defendant and his attorney which the court found was not within the
crime-fraud exception. As Judge (now Justice) Ginsburg stated, "[b]ecause the
afternoon conversation [between White and his attorney] was central to the
government's proof that White had criminal intent, its improper admission cannot
be deemed harmless." Id. at 272.
191 The district court has authority, in any event, to hold an adversarial,
evidentiary hearing at any stage. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
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pendency of the grand jury's investigation or at a later time when the
interest in grand jury secrecy has abated, it is only by allowing the privilege
holder to be heard that the significant social and personal interests, in due
process and attorney-client confidentiality, can be vindicated.

